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ZONING AND MARKET EXTERNALITIES
Amnon Lehavi*
ABSTRACT
The centennial of the 1916 New York City Ordinance and creation of
zoning in the United States provides an exceptional opportunity to
reconsider the regulatory and legal basis upon which the key governmental
power of zoning is founded. The motive to control the various market
externalities embedded in land use regulation, from effects on commercial
activity to housing prices and job-related housing needs, has practically
guided local governments from the very first days of zoning. Yet, at the same
time, such considerations of market externalities remain in the shadows of
explicit zoning law and policy, as the discussion is re-routed to the allegedly
more stable foundations of zoning, such as control of environmental, fiscal,
or social externalities.
This Article is the first to specifically explore the legitimacy of local
governments regulating private economic activities that have an aggregate
effect on the real estate market—defined here as “market externalities.”
May a local government limit the scope of new commercial uses, such as
shopping malls, if it believes that there is already an excess supply of them;
or constrain the entry of big-box retailers to preserve the economic viability
of existing retailers in a downtown business district? Can a land use
ordinance limit, or entirely prohibit, the renting out of housing units in a
certain neighborhood, to keep out investors who might drive up real estate
prices? Is government entitled to require a developer of market-rate
properties to pay a mitigation fee to finance affordable housing units—under
a theory that the project would generate new demand for local services
provided by modest-income workers who are in need of housing solutions?
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This Article develops an innovative theory of zoning and market
externalities. It argues that zoning power should extend to regulate market
externalities—provided that such decisions are based on a general land use
policy that can be clearly identified and are not tailored to intentionally
block, or legitimize, specific projects.
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INTRODUCTION
The New York Times recently portrayed the growing economic distress of
many enclosed shopping malls across the United States.1 The potential
reasons for this hardship are numerous, and not all malls share the same fate.
While high-end “A-rated” malls are performing well, middle- and workingclass malls are seeing increasing vacancy rates. The fundamental problem
of the latter malls is arguably one of over-abundance, the result of a “long
boom in building retail space of all kinds.”2 Moreover, once such a massive
space becomes vacant or entirely “dead,” its resurrection might prove a
daunting task.3
This turn of events may reinvigorate a long-standing debate about the
proper role of government in the real estate market. The current downturn

1. Nelson D. Schwartz, The Economics (and Nostalgia) of Dead Malls, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
3, 2015, at A1.
2. Id.
3. See Sarah Schindler, The Future of Abandoned Big Box Stores: Legal Solutions to
the Legacies of Poor Planning Decisions, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 471, 474 (2012) (describing
lingering problems of blight, symbolic decline, and economic harm to the surrounding
community resulting from largely vacant or entirely abandoned big-box retail stores and
suggesting various strategies to revitalize such derelict spaces).
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of multiple shopping malls could be seen as a sign of healthy competition
among retailers and an inevitable result of changing consumer preferences.
Alternatively, however, this decline might be an indication of some kind of
market- or government-failure. If the latter proposition is embraced,
government might legitimately avoid this failure by intervening early and
explicitly considering, within its land use regulation powers, the potential
effect of excess demand or other pecuniary impacts that a planned project
might entail.
As this Article shows, the economic effect of real estate developments is
a matter of crucial importance for private and public stakeholders, and such
considerations play a key role in land use decisions. The issue of pecuniary
externalities and other types of economic activities that have an aggregate
effect on the real estate market—defined here as “market externalities”—
may even be seen as going back to the days of establishing the institution of
zoning in the United States.4
However, the jurisprudence on the legitimacy of the government
explicitly addressing market externalities and on the standard of review that
should apply has been sporadic.5 In many cases, both policymakers and
courts avoid these questions by rerouting the analysis to the allegedly more
stable foundations of the zoning power, such as regulation of environmental
externalities caused by conflicting land uses, or fiscal externalities that
address developments’ impact on public infrastructure.6
Therefore, while economists have long addressed the welfare and
distributive effects of pecuniary externalities and have applied such insights
to the spatial-urban context, the legal profession has done neither.7 This
Article sets out to close this gap by developing a legal framework for zoning
and market externalities.
This Article asserts that the power of zoning and other types of land use
regulation should extend explicitly to regulate market externalities.
Regulatory decisions addressing pecuniary externalities should be
considered legitimate when such regulation establishes a general land use
policy and is not tailored to intentionally block or legitimize a specific
project. Every zoning decision must obviously account also for the specific
features of the project and the cost/benefit analysis it entails, and government
should be entitled to deviate from its general policy under extraordinary

4. See infra Section I.E.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Sections I.B and I.C.
7. The legal literature on the matter focuses mostly on the boundaries of limiting
competition but hardly addresses pecuniary externalities more systematically. See, e.g.,
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON ET AL., LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 112-21 (4th ed.
2013).
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circumstances. At the same time, judicial review should examine the
government’s ability to explicitly anchor its individual decisions within a
broader land use policy.
Although the dilemma of specific versus general decision making is
present for the more established justifications for zoning power, this tradeoff
is of particular importance in the context of regulating market externalities.8
Accordingly, courts should defer to governments by lowering their standard
of review only for actions made within a broader decision making
framework—not actions made outside of it.
Moreover, a local government’s zoning decision that regulates potential
market externalities may generate other types of market externalities,
positive or negative, across municipal borders. Judicial review of such
zoning decisions should also hold the local government accountable for the
potential threat of “regulatory opportunism,” in which a certain municipality
simply seeks to shoulder a specific negative market externality on the
residents of adjacent localities.9 The legal criteria for holding a municipality
responsible for an inter-local market externality, generated by its zoning
decision, should be based chiefly on the consistency of this effect with the
broad-based policy adopted by the municipality to regulate its own intralocal externalities.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I starts by concisely portraying
the power of zoning, and land use regulation in general, as it has emerged
over the past century. It discusses the gradual, often implicit expansion of
zoning’s legitimate goals as identified by courts and the corresponding
standards of judicial review applied to such measures. This Part analyzes
the different treatment of technological and environmental externalities,
fiscal externalities, and “social externalities” versus the treatment of market
externalities. While the former types of effects are viewed as operating
‘outside the market’ and, thus, liable to generate welfare inefficiencies,
economists have tended to view market externalities as operating ‘within the
market’ by solely affecting prices, thus producing no inefficiencies.10 From
a legal perspective, however, pecuniary or market externalities, whether
positive or negative, receive almost no explicit attention and remain in the
shadows of zoning law.11
8. See Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice
of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative State, 64 DUKE L. J. 133, 155-64 (2014)
(delineating types of regulatory permits, from specific to general, and describing how these
various options play out in the context of land use regulation).
9. See Amnon Lehavi, Intergovernmental Liability Rules, 92 V.A. L. REV. 929, 940-48
(2006) (discussing the concept of inter-local zoning externalities and the potential motives for
it).
10. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 43-45 (5th ed. 2007).
11. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Part II explores, in detail, market externalities. It discusses three different
settings. First, this Part asks whether government can limit the scope of new
commercial uses, such as shopping malls or big box retailers, if the city
believes that there is already excess supply of commerce or if the city
otherwise wishes to preserve the viability of its Central Business District
(“CBD”).12 Second, it examines various limits imposed on renting out
housing units in a certain jurisdiction, or parts thereof, in order to keep out
investors who might drive up real estate prices. Third, it asks whether a local
government is entitled to require a developer of market-rate properties to pay
a mitigation fee to finance affordable housing units—under the theory that
the project would generate demand for services, which would be provided
by low- and modest-income workers in need of housing.
Part III outlines the standards of judicial review that should apply to such
cases. It argues that land use decisions that regulate potential market
externalities should be granted a high degree of deference, as falling within
government’s police power, if the regulation is anchored in a general policy
that deals with the relevant features of the real estate market. The
municipality would thus have to establish a “substantial relation”13 between
its broad policy on market activities and measures taken to control adverse
market externalities. At the same time, such a local policy should be held
accountable for potential market externalities that this strategy may generate
for neighboring localities. This is required in order to prevent opportunism
among local governments in regulating market externalities.
I. EXTERNALITIES AND THEORIES OF ZONING
A.

The Zoning Power

Zoning was introduced in the United States—and quickly became
established—during the first three decades of the twentieth century.
Historical accounts of zoning regularly identify three key milestones in its
early regulatory and legal development.14
Historians consider the 1916 New York City Ordinance (“NYC
Ordinance”) to be the first comprehensive scheme to divide an entire
municipality into zones, in which permitted land uses, building volumes,
height restrictions, and other details were regulated.15 The second stage was
12. For the concept of a central business district as the commercial and financial hub of a
certain city, see BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, CITY ECONOMICS 126-27 (2005).
13. This standard of judicial review was set by the Supreme Court in the seminal case of
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926), discussed in infra notes
19-21 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 170-74.
15. It should be noted that prior to this ordinance, a number of American cities adopted
limited-purpose controls on construction, driven mostly by safety concerns, thus resembling
building and fire codes. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 57-58.
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the nearly uniform adoption of the 1926 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
(“SZEA”)16 and the 1928 Standard City Planning Enabling Act
(“SCPEA”),17 through which states granted localities the power to regulate
land use.18 The third prong was the 1926 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,19 in which the Court validated zoning
as falling within government’s police power.20 The Court held that the
exercise of the zoning power is constitutionally valid, unless such provisions
“are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”21
Over the following decades, federal and state courts generally tended to
frame the policy purposes and consequent legal contours of the zoning power
as falling within the scope of health, safety, morals, and general welfare, with
the latter, broad term allowing courts to give local governments significant
leeway in exercising their zoning power.22 While courts have examined
whether a particular zoning scheme meets the “substantial relation” test and
have otherwise developed a thick body of law on the potential application of
the Takings Clause to the regulation of land use,23 they have generally
refrained from an elaborate analysis of the underlying goals of zoning.24
When federal and state courts have agreed to dig into the proper purposes
of zoning, they have framed the analysis within zoning’s more stable
foundations, which include “technological” or environmental externalities.25
This framing has also allowed courts to analyze certain types of legitimate—
or illegitimate—forms of social planning by tying such “social externalities”
to questions, for example, of incompatible uses or density control.26 Courts
also address the control of “fiscal externalities.”27 In contrast, judges have

16. Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., A Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act (1926 rev’d ed.).
17. Advisory Comm. on City Planning and Zoning, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., A Standard City
Planning Enabling Act (1928).
18. Over the years, several states amended their enabling statutes, and some aspects of
zoning are also regulated by state-level and federal legislation. However, the overall focus of
zoning on local government power remains intact. See Lehavi, supra note 9, at 935-37.
19. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
20. Id. at 389-90.
21. Id. at 389-90, 395.
22. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 114-15.
23. For a survey of the case law on the types of land use regulation that may amount to
an uncompensated taking in-effect of private property contrary to the Fifth Amendment, see
id. at 134-87.
24. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, ZONING RULES: THE ECONOMICS OF LAND USE REGULATION §§
3.12-3.25 (2015).
25. See infra Section I.B.
26. See infra Section I.B.
27. See infra Section I.C.
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rarely explicitly addressed the nature of underlying goals relating to
“pecuniary externalities” or “market externalities.”28
The NYC Ordinance29 demonstrates how the promotion of zoning’s four
goals might actually affect the motivation for zoning and the ways in which
some pronounced goals might take over the overt discourse.
The chief proponents of the measure were members of the real estate
industry and business owners in the city who were “anxious to put an end to
the damages wrought by uncontrolled development.”30 They were joined in
their efforts by planning advocates, professional reformers, and public
officials, who had different agendas.31 Thus, for example, progressives and
reformers viewed zoning as a means to limit “untrammeled capitalism” and
to make the city more beautiful and livable.32 The underlying views on the
desirable nature of the market were far from uniform.
In breaking down the specific concerns that drove the promulgation of the
NYC Ordinance, one can identify all the motives for zoning, namely:
limiting technological or environmental externalities, fiscal externalities,
market externalities, and promoting social planning. First, owners of
downtown office buildings increasingly lost their access to sunlight and air
to new skyscrapers, thus decreasing their rental value.33 This loss of sunlight
had a dramatic impact, because, up until the 1940s, sunlight was the principal
source of illumination for interiors.34 The scope of such externalities was
considerable: the forty-story Equitable Building, completed in 1915, cast a
shadow over four high-value blocks.35 To control this externality, the NYC
Ordinance imposed height limits and setback requirements.36 As Section I.B
shows, responses to these and other technological or environmental
externalities became the mainstay of zoning concerning both land uses and
building restrictions.
A second type of concern that drove the New York City regulation
demonstrates how technological or environmental issues can become
meshed with “social externalities.” Owners and operators of high-end retail
stores along Fifth Avenue were concerned about the entry of manufacturing

28. See infra Section I.D.
29. See Zoning Background, N.Y.C. PLAN., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/zoning/
background.page [https://perma.cc/UGS6-F5SN].
30. Raphaël Fischler, The Metropolitan Dimension of Early Zoning: Revisiting the 1916
New York City Ordinance, 64(2) J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 170, 170 (1998).
31. Id. at 171.
32. O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 171-72.
33. Fischler, supra note 30, at 172-73.
34. See CAROL WILLIS, FORM FOLLOWS FINANCE: SKYSCRAPERS AND SKYLINES IN NEW
YORK AND CHICAGO 24-26 (1995).
35. O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 172.
36. Id. at 173.
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lofts, which employed many poor immigrant women.37 Their fear was that
the mass presence of working-class women on the streets would deter the
stores’ wealthy clientele and undermine the area’s appeal. Framed, however,
as a problem of incompatible uses, the city was divided into three types of
use districts: one reserved solely for housing, another open to commerce, and
a third allowing industry.38 Indirect social planning was, thus, promoted
through zoning.
A third problem involved fiscal externalities, namely the growing pressure
that the rapid private development of real estate placed on the city’s public
infrastructure. Both in the financial district and on Fifth Avenue,
development caused acute street congestion.39 Human congestion also posed
health threats in both tenement areas and office buildings. Moreover, the
congestion issue coincided with the city’s effort to unite the five boroughs
by an integrated public transit system.40 Placing limits on building volumes
was therefore intended to serve the broader goal of dispersing the population
into outer areas, which would, in turn, facilitate the inter-borough layout of
the public transit system.41
Further, the constant movement of different populations and activities
made it difficult for school authorities to allocate children to particular
schools. The mix of land uses also increased the costs of policing, firefighting, street maintenance, and postal delivery.42 The division of the city
into use-districts and limits on building volumes were, thus, essential to
provide more permanent structure to the city’s neighborhoods and allow for
a well-functioning infrastructure. As Section I.C shows, fiscal zoning has
since become an explicit regulatory principle.
Finally, market externalities were at play as a motivating force for the
NYC Ordinance, although their role has been formally overshadowed by the
other considerations mentioned above. In 1916, the New York office market
went through a period of high vacancy rates, exacerbated by the 1.2 million
square feet of the Equitable Building.43 Owners of existing buildings, thus,
wanted to limit new construction that might cause a drop in rents or drive up
vacancy rates.44 Concerns over the stability of real estate values were not
constrained, however, to corporate and retail areas in the city. The NYC
Ordinance sought also to protect residential properties and, in particular, the

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Fischler, supra note 30, at 172-73.
Id. at 170, 172; O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 172-73.
Fischler, supra note 30, at 173.
Id. at 178-80.
Id.
Id. at 180-81.
O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 172.
Fischler, supra note 30, at 172-73.
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single-family home, considered to be the apex of the hierarchy of land uses.45
The motives for doing so included a mix of technological or environmental
concerns stemming from incompatible uses; social motives derived from the
view of zoning as a “moral system that both reflects and assures social
order,” and economic concerns over the price effect of over-development.46
This mixture of motives typifies later waves of regulatory measures,
including the proliferation of various growth-control schemes in suburban
and metropolitan areas during the 1960s and 1970s, sometimes derogatively
referred to as “exclusionary zoning.”47
From minimum-lot-size
requirements to outright moratoria, those measures were motivated by
current owners’ wishes to limit housing supply.48 In this sense, they feature
a clear motive influenced by the control of market externalities.
These economic considerations were intermingled with other motivations,
which played a more explicit role in the public discourse and legal
controversies that ensued. With the rapid development of interstate
highways, both businesses and lower-income households became physically
more mobile, allowing them to move from cities into the suburbs.49
Suburban localities, controlled politically by current homeowners, employed
various land use controls to restrict development, particularly low-income
housing opportunities.50
Localities sought to justify such constraints to guard against technological
or environmental externalities, such as increased traffic congestion and air
pollution.51 Fiscal zoning also featured prominently. Residents of highincome suburbs feared that admitting families who purchase homes with a
value below the community average, but who otherwise make equal or
higher demands on the public infrastructure, such as schools, would lower
the property tax base per family, thus resulting in an increase in tax rates.52
Finally, social planning motives seemed to have drawn most of the attention.
Viewed as measures aimed at discriminating against low-income households
and racial minorities, zoning and planning programs were debated before

45. Id. at 178.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Robert Inman & Daniel Rubinfeld, The Judicial Pursuit of Local Fiscal
Equity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1685-89 (1979).
48. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 430 (1977).
49. FISCHEL, supra note 24, at § 5.25.
50. Id.
51. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 850-51.
52. Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 47, at 1685-86.
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courts, with New Jersey’s Mount Laurel litigation being the epitome of the
scrutiny such motives faced.53
Differentiating between the various motives for zoning may, thus, prove
a difficult task in examining individual instances of government action.54
This chore is nevertheless essential, especially to the extent that one type of
motive seeks to hide behind another more defensible ground. This is
especially so with market externalities, which have largely remained a legal
blind spot, although they play a significant practical role in zoning. The
following sections set out to analyze each of the above-mentioned types of
externalities, addressing their treatment in the academic literature and
application to the legal setting.
B.

Technological or Environmental Externalities

The British economist Arthur Pigou formalized the concept of
technological or environmental externalities in the early twentieth century.55
During the second half of the twentieth century, scholars increasingly
examined the policy and legal implications of such externalities, with the two
terms—“technological”
and
“environmental”—being
used
interchangeably.56 Since then, it has become the subject of extensive
scholarship.57
Economists define a technological or environmental
externality as the “indirect effect of a consumption activity or a production
activity on the consumption set of a consumer, the utility function of a
consumer, or the production function of a producer.”58 The term “indirect”
relates to an effect that “does not work through the price system.”59
Such externalities can be positive, such as when a firm makes available a
new technology or information that allows other firms to manufacture

53. For an overview of the Mount Laurel litigation, see ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7,
at 758-78 (showing how the New Jersey courts gradually required local governments to
affirmatively promote low- and modest-income housing by also providing a “builder’s
remedy” that grants developers a building permit as a right under certain conditions).
54. See Eric A. Haunshek & John M. Quigley, Commercial Land Use Regulation and
Local Government Finance, 80(2) AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 176, 177 (1990) (arguing,
that as an empirical matter, “it is extremely hard to sort out the pecuniary from the [other]
externality motives for zoning”).
55. See ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE, Ch. IX (4th ed. 1932).
56. Probably the two most notable examples are Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960), and Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972).
57. For a partial list of such current works, see Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels,
Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 136, 136 n.1 (2014).
58. J.J. Laffont, Externalities, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven
N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
59. Id.
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improved products or to cut costs.60 Negative externalities, which have
attracted more attention in the policy and law context, prominently include
adverse environmental effects. Air pollution is probably the best-articulated
example.61 Other technological or environmental externalities, which have
a particular bearing on land use, have also been investigated in both theory
and practice: noise, groundwater pollution, and the blocking of sunlight or
the flow of air.62
A key point in understanding the role of technological or environmental
externalities in land use regulation concerns the intricate ties between the
zoning power and otherwise actionable harms, such as private or public
nuisance.63 On the one hand, zoning emerged as a top-down regulatory
mechanism that controls in advance certain aspects of conflicting land uses,
which might otherwise lead to nuisance litigation. Legislatures and courts
have explicitly articulated the close ties between zoning and nuisance control
from the early days of zoning. As the Supreme Court famously noted in
Euclid, “a nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place—like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”64 Zoning is thus justified as a
mechanism that spatially orders land uses to minimize potential cases of
nuisance.
Accordingly, zoning is intended to save on transaction costs that parties
may incur in trying to privately resolve land use conflicts,65 or on the costs
of nuisance litigation.66 As a doctrinal matter, the fact that an activity is
“properly conducted at a place authorized for it under zoning” would
regularly shield it from a private nuisance claim, although the case might be
somewhat different for some types of public nuisance.67 One further link
between zoning and nuisance control concerns the “nuisance exception”

60. For a discussion of positive externalities, and their respective economic and legal
differences from negative ones, see, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Negative Liability, 38 J.
LEGAL STUD. 21, 22-30 (2009).
61. Pigou discussed the adverse effects of smoke from factory chimneys on the
surrounding community. PIGOU, supra note 55, at Ch. IX., § 10. This example has also been
extensively analyzed in the foundational works of Coase, supra note 56, and Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 56.
62. Consider, for example, Coase’s discussion of the confectioner, the noise and
vibrations from his machine that disturb a neighboring doctor in his work, and how such a
conflict may be reframed as a having a reciprocal nature. Ronald H. Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1, 26-27 (1959).
63. See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, 8 THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.3 (3d ed.
2000 & Supp. 2015).
64. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
65. See Neil Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 218, 219-21 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al.
eds., 1978).
66. See ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 539-68.
67. MCQUILLIN, supra note 63, at § 25.13
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doctrine, which stipulates that some types of land use regulations might not
constitute a taking even if they proscribe, without compensation, preexisting
activities that amount to “harmful or noxious uses.”68
Nevertheless, the zoning power may go well beyond nuisance control.69
Zoning regulates various types of technological or environmental
externalities that do not amount to nuisances or other civil wrongs. For
example, a zoning decision may impose a density limit to control several
issues, including the level of traffic congestion within a development and its
vicinity. Nuisance law does not regularly hold a car user liable for the
potential externalities she may cause to other residents or drivers because of
increased congestion.70 It is not a type of behavior in which the law identifies
a “wrongdoer” engaging in a harmful conduct toward others.71 In fact, this
is a type of behavior in which the law is aligned with Coase’s view of
nonconforming uses or externalities as having a “reciprocal nature,” meaning
that we cannot categorically identify a “wrongdoer” and a “victim” in such
scenarios.72 The solution for the lack of clear guidance by private law
mechanisms is provided by regulation. One possible venue is a congestion
fee—functioning as a “Pigouvian tax”—in which car users internalize the
marginal externalities they generate by the payment of a time-based fee.73
This is feasible for toll roads, bridges, and tunnels, which serve as
transportation arteries. However, it is not regularly the case with residential
neighborhoods, in which residents are tied to a specific place, meaning that
fees would not self-resolve congestion problems. Zoning establishes the
level of building density that is seen as appropriate for such developments,

68. This doctrine, while controversial and not fully articulated by courts, originates in the
pre-zoning-era case of Mugler v. Kansas. The Court refused to apply the Takings Clause to a
regulation that prohibited the manufacture and sale of liquor in Kansas, a prohibition that
applied also to existing breweries. It reasoned that the regulation stopped an activity that was
“injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community.” 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887). In
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent,
referred to this exception but described it as applying only to “noxious uses.” 438 U.S. 104,
144-46 (1978). In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, generally referred to the doctrine but held that it does not
apply to the case at hand. 505 U.S. 1003, 1020-26 (1992).
69. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 719-60 (1973).
70. See, e.g., Ralph Slovenko, Desocialization by Automobile, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1767,
1788-89 (2008).
71. For the notion that nuisance law deals with identifying “substandard” behaviors, see
Ellickson, supra note 69, at 728-31.
72. See Coase, supra note 56, at 2 (suggesting that “[w]e are dealing with a problem of a
reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A. The real question that
has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?”).
73. O’FLAHERTY, supra note 12, at 58-61.
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considering also on-site and off-site roads, parking, etc.74 Zoning thus deals
with technological or environmental externalities that go beyond nuisance
control. The same holds true for other land use regulations, such as aesthetic
controls.75 Any such regulation would have to meet the “substantial
relation” test set up in Euclid and subsequent cases,76 but the underlying
goals well exceed nuisance control.
The role of zoning in controlling technological or environmental
externalities thus bears an important lesson for the other grounds for zoning,
discussed in the following sections. The legitimacy of zoning is not
dependent on demonstrating that a certain developer or a person who uses
the land engages, or is about to engage, in wrongful conduct (in the private
law realm). At the same time, to justify constraints imposed by a zoning
scheme, the local government must provide a rationale for the ways in which
land uses and building volumes are regulated. Moreover, the farther away
from conduct that would otherwise be considered wrongful, the more the
municipality would have to ground such constraints in a broad-based
rationale. This insight has key implications for regulating market
externalities.
C.

Fiscal Externalities

According to the 2012 Census of Governments, state and local
governments continue to rely heavily on revenues from their own sources to
finance their expenditures.77 For local governments, taxes represent the
largest source of general revenue.78 Property taxes are most prominent,
accounting for 73.5 percent of all local tax revenues.79 Between 2007 and
2012, local property tax receipts increased by more than fifteen percent.80
The prominence of local revenue—and property tax in particular—for
local government finance has always had important implications for land use
policy.81 In making zoning decisions, local governments may often want to

74. See, e.g., Roberts v. Plan. and Zoning Comm’n, No. CV010379911S, 2003 WL
21235343, at *3-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 15, 2003) (highlighting the centrality of the traffic
congestion factor in deciding about certain types of land use projects).
75. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics
in Zoning Central City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. REV. 445, 483-88 (1998)
(discussing the legitimacy of aesthetic zoning in the absence of recognition for aesthetic
nuisance).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
77. See Jeffrey L. Barnett et al., 2012 Census of Governments: Finance—State and Local
Governments Summary Report, 3 (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www2.census.gov/govs/local/
summary_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GF66-JL9P].
78. Taxes represent more than forty percent of localities’ general revenues. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Lehavi, supra note 9, at 948-52 (discussing the “fiscalization of zoning”).
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ensure that “households or firms generate a fiscal surplus, not a deficit.”82
Thus, in considering whether to approve a new zoning scheme, a local
government may be motivated to compare its expected marginal
expenditures to its provision of public services with the expected marginal
public revenues.83
In the residential context, suburban localities have often resorted to zoning
mechanisms, such as minimum lot size or other density limits, to thwart
indirect fiscal deficits. Such localities are often especially anxious about
households that purchase small-size properties with a value below the
community average—and thus pay lower property taxes—but otherwise
have high demand for public infrastructure and schools.84 The practical
result of large-lot or other low-density zoning is one in which lower-income
households with school-aged children would be largely left out of the
community. In this sense, the fiscal motive plays an essential role in such
types of exclusionary zoning.85 The fiscal tradeoff would be different for
high-value properties. The same may hold true for retail businesses that
yield not only property tax revenues but also sales tax receipts.86
The SZEA empowers local governments to engage in fiscal zoning in the
residential context by allowing them to control various aspects of private
development, including the size of the lot, a building’s height, or its
contribution to overall density.87 Moreover, local governments do not have
to ground zoning rules, such as minimum lot size, explicitly in fiscal
considerations. The reasons for minimum lot size can also be for positive
environmental externalities—because people value open spaces between
houses88—so that such zoning rules may otherwise promote Euclid’s idea of
“general welfare.”
In some cases, however, the question of legitimacy of fiscal zoning
becomes explicit. The most prominent example is “exactions,” requirements
that “developers provide, or pay for, some public facility or other amenity as
a condition for receiving permission for a land use.”89 Notwithstanding the
82. ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN, URBAN ECONOMICS 228 (7th ed. 2009).
83. See generally ROBERT W. BURCHELL ET AL., DEVELOPMENT IMPACT: ASSESSMENT
HANDBOOK 11-12 (1994).
84. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
85. O’SULLIVAN, supra note 82, at 228-29.
86. Accordingly, in many cases, local governments seek to attract retail uses that yield
high sales tax gains. See Jonathan Schwartz, Note, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes,
Property Taxes, and the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
183, 209-13 (1997) (analyzing the Oxnard-Ventura “sales tax war” in Ventura County,
California as driving local land use decisions).
87. Fischel, supra note 24, at § 4.6.
88. O’SULLIVAN, supra note 82, at 229-30.
89. Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 479 (1991).
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various complications entailed in this body of case law,90 as most recently
expressed in the Supreme Court decision Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Management District,91 the focus of the legal debate on exactions can be
conceptualized as involving the legitimate scope of government control over
fiscal externalities.
Prior to the Koontz decision, the benchmark for the judicial review of
exactions was established in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission92 and
Dolan v. City of Tigard.93 In Nollan, the Court invalidated a California
requirement conditioning a building permit for a beachfront property on the
owner granting a public easement along the mean high tide line. The Court
held that such an exaction lacked an “essential nexus” to the project’s
anticipated effects.94 In Dolan, the court held that a substantial nexus did
exist between a request to expand a hardware store and pave a parking lot
and the city’s requirement to hand over a piece of the property for a public
flood plain and a bicycle path. However, the Court found that the scope of
the exaction lacked “rough proportionality” to the expansion’s impact.95 A
failure to meet the tests of “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality,”
respectively, triggers the Takings Clause.96 The Court based its rulings on
the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, by which government may not
condition the granting of a discretionary benefit on the applicant’s waiver of
a constitutional right—in this case, payment of just compensation for the
property interest in land taken by the city.97
In Koontz, a five to four majority applied the Nollan/Dolan framework to
a case in which the petitioner was denied a permit request to develop 3.7
acres of privately owned wetland.98 The denial followed Koontz’s refusal to
make a payment to finance the improvement of the drainage on another tract,
owned by the government.99 The majority applied the Nollan/Dolan
standards and the Takings Clause to this required payment, reasoning that
“the [demand for money] burdened petitioner’s ownership of a specific
parcel of land.”100 This exaction was, thus, materially different from tax

90. See Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT. REV.
289 (2014).
91. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
92. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
93. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
94. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837-42.
95. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391-95.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3.
97. See Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 90, at 294-95.
98. Koontz v. St. Johns Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592-93 (2013).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2599.
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liability.101 Following Koontz, any exaction imposed on a private owner,
whether in the form of a property interest in land or a monetary obligation,
must meet the essential nexus/rough proportionality standard.
What does the jurisprudence on exactions demonstrate about the
legitimacy of land use regulation, aimed at controlling fiscal externalities
resulting from private developments? The Nollan/Dolan standard validates
such a fiscal motive in principle, provided that the measure taken
corresponds in both nature and scope to the specific fiscal externality
generated by the proposed development. Even under such a heightened
standard, therefore, the control of fiscal externalities would be considered
legitimate.
A question that remains open in the aftermath of Koontz is whether the
Nollan/Dolan framework applies only to a requirement made on an “ad hoc
basis upon an individual permit applicant” or also to a “legislatively
prescribed condition that applied to a broad class of permit applicants.”102 If
the Nollan/Dolan framework is limited to only “ad hoc” or “adjudicative”
situations—as the California Supreme Court recently held103—this means
that “legislative” land use measures, such as a zoning ordinance, would enjoy
the deferential “substantial relation” standard and would not implicate the
Takings Clause. In such a case, the legislative measure would have to create
a general framework for holding proposed developments accountable to the
fiscal externalities they are expected to generate. The challenge for such a
legislative measure would not be gaining the legitimacy to rely explicitly on
fiscal considerations. It would lie, rather, in the ability of a broad-based
ordinance to anticipate properly the marginal fiscal externalities of a range
of specific projects in devising internalization mechanisms.104 As Parts II
and III show, this is exactly the challenge that applies to market externalities.
D.

Social Externalities

The previous sections have already touched on the various ways in which
zoning rules, otherwise grounded in considerations of environmental or
fiscal externalities, may lead to exclusionary social practices—with lowincome households being the usual victims.105 However, the scope of social
motives for zoning exceeds socioeconomic stratification or even covert
issues of race and ethnicity. A municipality, especially one politically

101.
102.
2015).
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 2600-02.
See California Bldg. Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 990 n.11 (Cal.
Id. at 991-92.
Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 90, at 340-46.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-38, 47-53, 85-86.
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dominated by current homeowners,106 may engage in various methods to
preserve social order through zoning. It would be particularly legitimate to
do so when those affected by such measures do not belong to a
constitutionally protected suspect class and when the social motive can be
complemented by—or even hidden behind—the control of environmental or
fiscal externalities.
A notable example is Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,107 in which the
Supreme Court upheld the village’s restriction of residential land uses to onefamily dwellings based on the ordinance’s definition of “family” as “[o]ne
or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and cooking
together as a single housekeeping unit . . . ”108 As a result, a village
homeowner was barred from leasing his home to six college students.109
The Court rejected equal protection and other constitutional claims
against the zoning measure and relied on a mix of environmental and social
externality rationales.110 It reasoned that “a quiet place where yards are wide,
people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land
use project addressed to family needs.”111 The Court also held that “the
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people.”112
According to the Court, therefore, the negative externalities generated by
a house occupied by college students comprise both environmental and
social externalities, and the village could legitimately control them.113 Next
to urban problems of congestion and noise,114 the Court viewed the presence
of housekeeping units outside the scope of a “family”—as the zoning
measure defined the term—as adversely affecting the village’s “values.”115
While controversial, this decision seems to give a mandate to at least some
sort of social planning via zoning.
However, social planning via zoning need not be necessarily about
exclusion. In fact, the growing phenomenon of “inclusionary zoning”
measures, by which localities require or encourage developers to include

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See FISCHEL, supra note 24, at § 5.24.
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
416 U.S. 9 (1974).
Id.
Id.
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below-market-priced units in residential projects,116 is embedded in a
concept of positive social externalities. The U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (“HUD”) has long adopted a policy, according to
which the “integration of affordable units into market-rate projects creates
opportunities for households with diverse socioeconomic backgrounds to
live in the same developments” and providing access to the “same types of
community services and amenities.”117
Beyond the static concept of social justice, by which low- and modestincome households are able to afford housing in high demand areas, the
rationale of inclusionary zoning also features a dynamic component that
deals with positive social externalities.118
An underlying assumption that drives inclusionary zoning is positive
synergy between different socioeconomic groups, serving mostly the
interests of low- and modest-income households, and children in particular,
while not harming upper-income households.
Mixed-income
neighborhoods, thus, arguably come closer to a socially optimal
interpersonal spatial design.119 While such inclusionary zoning mechanisms
have had a fair number of critics120 and existing data does not always point
to success,121 the positive social externalities remain a driving motivation of
housing policy.
A 2015 decision by the California Supreme Court, California Building
Industry Association v. City of San Jose,122 highlights both the current
features of inclusionary zoning and the way such schemes are viewed as
entailing positive social externalities. In 2010, the City of San Jose enacted
an inclusionary zoning ordinance, requiring developers of twenty or more

116. See Rachel Meltzer & Jennifer Schuetz, What Drives the Diffusion of Inclusionary
Zoning?, 29 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGM’T 578 (2010); Jennifer Schuetz et al., Silver Bullet or
Trojan Horse? The Effects of Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets in the United
States, 48 URB. STUD. 298 (2011).
117. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., EVIDENCE MATTERS: INCLUSIONARY ZONING
AND MIXED-INCOME DEVELOPMENTS (Spring 2013), http://www.huduser.org/portal/
periodicals/em/spring13/highlight3.html [https://perma.cc/D5WM-CCGQ].
118. See Amnon Lehavi, Can the Housing Market be Split to Facilitate Long-Term
Affordability?
3-7
(Working
Paper,
2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2386212
[https://perma.cc/PJ59-CPEN].
119. See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND
PROPERTY LINES 123-48 (2009) (discussing the various dynamic effects of grouping-effects
and neighborhood composition).
120. See Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project,
57 UCLA L. REV. 983 (2010).
121. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY FOR FAIR HOUSING
DEMONSTRATION
PROGRAM:
FINAL
IMPACTS
EVALUATION
(2011),
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/MTOFHD_fullreport_v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QF9A-L9C4].
122. 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015).
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housing units to sell fifteen percent of the for-sale units at a price affordable
to low- and moderate-income households.123 The ordinance offered
developers several alternatives to the provision of on-site affordable units—
such as provision of a higher number of off-site affordable units or payment
of a substitute fee—but strongly pushed developers toward the on-site
alternative.124 Upholding the ordinance, the Court identified the ordinance’s
legitimate purposes not only of increasing the number of affordable housing
units, but more particularly, of “assuring that new affordable housing units
that are constructed are distributed throughout the city as part of mixedincome developments in order to obtain the benefits that flow from
economically diverse communities.”125
The Court further viewed the requirement to sell fifteen percent of the forsale units at an affordable price as a condition that “simply places a
restriction on the way the developer may use its property,” similar to other
land use regulations or a rent control ordinance, which do not amount to
exactions.126 The Court reviewed the ordinance under a “reasonable
relationship” standard, so that the City did not have to demonstrate the
Nollan/Dolan nexus between the development and the additional need for
affordable housing.127
Following the California Building Industry
Association decision, a government’s use of on-site inclusionary zoning to
promote positive social externalities in mixed-income neighborhoods is not
subjected to heightened scrutiny of its fiscal motives.
As a final note, in 2015, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio unveiled
his plans to enact a citywide ordinance that will require all developers
seeking to rezone land for housing to build a specific number of on-site
affordable units.128 The inclusionary zoning provisions are “hard, new
requirements that for the very first time set a floor for the affordable housing
communities are owed in new developments.”129 The focus on on-site units
seeks to promote the social externalities of mixed-income housing. The
program was approved by the city council in March 2016.130 Accordingly,
the promotion of inclusionary social externalities in New York City is no
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

San Jose Mun. Code, §§ 5.08.10-5.08.730.
351 P.3d, at 983-84.
Id. at 979.
Id. at 991.
Id. at 987-91.
Sally Goldenberg, De Blasio Plan Would Link Affordable Housing, Rezoning,
POLITICO (July 31, 2015 05:30 AM), http://www.politico.com/states/new-york/cityhall/story/2015/07/de-blasio-plan-would-link-affordable-housing-rezoning-024125
[https://perma.cc/CEN4-P23T].
129. Id. (quoting Mayor de Blasio).
130. NEW YORK CITY, MANDATORY INCLUSIONARY ZONING (Mar. 22, 2016),
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans-studies/mih/approved-text032216.pdf [https://perma.cc/83VR-KYDC].
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longer done by ad hoc requirements but, instead, through a citywide policy
anchored in zoning laws. The promotion of positive social externalities is
now explicitly enshrined in the zoning power.
E.

Pecuniary and Market Externalities

Alongside the analysis of technological or environmental externalities,
economists have also considered the role of pecuniary externalities, which
work through the price system.131 In a market economy, certain activities by
persons or firms change relative prices or affect the value of assets. These
changes create benefits for, or impose costs on, third parties.132 Economists
regularly argue that pecuniary externalities do not affect welfare
economics.133 They suggest that “the ability of new firms to enter an industry
and inflict pecuniary losses on existing firms is the process that generates
efficiency in competitive markets.”134 Allowing firms to inflict losses on
competitors may be viewed as necessary for economic efficiency. Because
market actors have property rights over the resources they own but not over
their future value, they are not entitled to compensation for pecuniary losses
inflicted on them by other market actors.135
Over the past decades, however, some economists have acknowledged
that, in the realistic world of imperfect markets, pecuniary externalities may
have welfare effects. Paul Krugman has notably shown that in a world of
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale, pecuniary externalities
do matter.136 Market-size effects are a particular source of pecuniary
externalities with genuine welfare impacts, and these, in turn, have
substantial implications for siting choices of firms and the ordering of land
uses.137
Krugman examines manufacturers whose industries, unlike agricultural
producers, are typified by increasing returns to scale and a relatively compact
use of land.138 Manufacturers generally prefer to locate factories near their

131. See Laffont, supra note 58.
132. Randall G. Holcombe & Russell S. Sobel, Public Policy toward Pecuniary
Externalities, 29 PUB. FIN. REV. 304, 304 (2001).
133. Laffont, supra note 58. Welfare economics generally deals with ways to ensure a
distribution of resources that would maximize overall utility across the relevant group or
society. Kenneth J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of the Classical Welfare
Economics, Cowles Commission Paper, New Series, No. 54 (1951), 507-32.
134. Holcombe & Sobel, supra note 132, at 305.
135. Id. at 304-05.
136. Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483,
485 (1991).
137. See Ron Martin & Peter Sunley, Paul Krugman’s Geographical Economics and its
Implications for Regional Development Theory: A Critical Assessment, 72 ECON. GEO. 259,
266-68 (1996).
138. Krugman, supra note 136, at 485.
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demand markets, because this reduces transportation costs.139 The source of
the demand, however, does not come only from the agricultural sector or
from end-consumers. It is also derived from within the manufacturing sector
itself.140
The result is one of agglomeration or geographical concentration, and it is
embedded in positive, reciprocal pecuniary externalities. On the supply side,
“manufacturer production will tend to concentrate where there is a large
market, but the market will be large where manufactures production is
concentrated.”141 On the demand side, firms will tend to “live and produce
near a concentration of manufacturing production because it will then be less
expensive to buy the goods their central place provides.”142
Accordingly, the demand for certain land uses, and the regulatory
considerations that need to be taken into account in ordering land uses, might
implicate market externalities that have genuine welfare effects. Consider,
for example, a plan to rezone agricultural land, located at the fringe of an
industrial zone. The developer intends to set up an industrial plant that will
manufacture steel products. In deciding whether to approve such a
development, the municipality should consider not only technological or
environmental externalities, such as increased pollution, or fiscal
externalities, such as increased pressure on public roads, but also potential
market externalities. If the presence of the steel plant will benefit other
industries already located in the adjacent industrial zone—serving both the
demand and supply side of the industrial products market—this positive
market externality should be considered.
This does not mean, of course, that the concentration of similar land uses
will always generate positive market externalities with an overall welfare
effect. This is especially true concerning retail businesses, in which the issue
of an internal supply and demand of products among businesses themselves
is less relevant. Market externalities will apply mostly to the effect that
businesses have on other businesses in positively or negatively attracting
customers. Several studies have examined the effects of large retail
businesses on revenues of other retailers and local employment rates, coming
at times to different conclusions: some works seek to document the adverse
effects that Wal-Mart stores have on other retail firms and total retail

139. Id. at 485-86.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. See also Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive
Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 240 (2012) (noting the mutual nature of positive
externalities in the case of agglomeration effects).
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employment,143 while other studies show positive pecuniary externalities
that large retailers generate for nearby retail establishments.144
In a recent study of the effects of big-box retailers on nearby
establishments, Daniel Shoag and Stan Veuger offer a theory that seeks to
bridge previous studies.145 They argue that while the overall pecuniary
effects of large retailers are positive, directly competing retailers are
economically harmed by the presence of a big-box store.146 The businesses
that are positively impacted by their presence are ones that depend heavily
on foot traffic, such as small retailers or restaurants. This also means that
such positive externalities are negatively correlated with distance from the
big retailer, meaning that such positive effects will be particularly significant
within approximately a one-mile radius.147 Moreover, this positive
dependence has welfare effects, because many of these affected businesses
cannot relocate in the event that the big-box store closes down.148
From a broader perspective, localities making zoning decisions should
consider three types of market externalities: (1) welfare effects, (2)
distributive effects, and (3) “second-hand” off-site environmental or fiscal
externalities.
First, developers’ siting choices and resulting zoning decisions may yield
market externalities with a genuine welfare effect. Importantly, adjacent
land users, who may be positively or negatively affected by a decision to
rezone land or to otherwise approve a certain development, should not be
seen as having an enforceable individual legal interest concerning market
externalities. Adversely affected competitors should not be entitled to block
a development because of potential market externalities, the same way that
positively affected land users are not in a position to force the municipality
to approve the project. Yet zoning goes beyond identifying specific legal
interests that may be otherwise enforceable or actionable. Just as
considerations of technological or environmental externalities extend
beyond the prevention of nuisances that would be otherwise actionable in
143. See, e.g., David Neumark et al., The Effects of Wal-Mart on Local Labor Markets, 63
J. URB. ECON. 405 (2008) (presenting data by which a Wal-Mart store opening reduces
county-level retail employment by about 150 workers, implying that each Wal-Mart worker
replaces approximately 1.4 retail workers).
144. See, e.g., Efraim Benmelech et al., The Agglomeration of Bankruptcy, NBER Working
Paper no. 20254 (2014) (observing that retail stores’ bankruptcies produce negative
externalities for other businesses).
145. Daniel Shoag & Stan Veuger, Shops and the City: Evidence on Local Externalities
and Local Government Policy from Big-Box Bankruptcies (Working Paper, 2015),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shoag/files/shops_in_the_city.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN6VSCCJ].
146. Id. at 6-13.
147. Id. at 13.
148. Id.
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private law litigation, so do market externalities merit consideration by local
governments if such externalities entail potential welfare effects.
Second, the distribution of positive market externalities, notwithstanding
aggregate welfare effects, may also be a legitimate consideration in zoning
decisions. Economists have tended to view such distributive grounds
suspiciously, suggesting that the political process may allow powerful
industries to protect their pecuniary interests at the expense of promoting
overall welfare, such as by blocking competing land uses.149
As Sections II.A and III.A show, there is indeed room for concern when
decisions driven by market externalities seek merely to serve as an
anticompetitive, or an otherwise protectionist measure, at the expense of
competitors and other stakeholders.150 Yet distributive considerations that
stem from market externalities should not always be considered normatively
inadequate, especially when they are grounded in broad-based policy
decisions. Section II.C discusses, for example, the pecuniary effects that
market-rate developments may entail for low- and modest-income
households.151 To the extent that inclusionary zoning schemes are grounded
in such market externalities and are part of a broad-based policy that
addresses access to housing, the consideration of market externalities and
their distributive effects may be legitimately weighed in such decisions.
Third, market externalities may also indirectly generate second-hand offsite technological, environmental, or fiscal externalities. Section II.A
discusses the effects that a big-box store, such as IKEA or Wal-Mart, may
have on small retail businesses located in the municipality’s CBD.152 A land
use decision approving big-box development may create adverse market
externalities for nearby businesses. In some cases, the closing down of a
critical mass of retailers and related businesses, such as restaurants, may
cause the CBD to decline. As documented in numerous studies, such an
urban decline may have long-lasting effects that also feature adverse
technological or environmental or fiscal externalities—ones that take years
and much effort to reverse.153
This does not mean that the interests of businesses and other stakeholders
in the CBD should always prevail over those of developers, who may have a
legitimate business interest in operating somewhere else. Moreover, such
developers are not individually responsible for the adverse results of such

149. Holcombe & Sobel, supra note 132, at 319-22.
150. See infra Sections II.A, III.A.
151. See infra Section II.C.
152. For the concept of a CBD see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Dagney Faulk, The Process and Practice of Downtown Revitalization, 23
REV. POL’Y RES. 625 (2006) (surveying the literature on how CBDs decline over time and
whether they can be revitalized).
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urban decay, such as physical blight or a decreased sense of security among
remaining residents and businesses. No individual legal fault should be
attributed to such developers for second hand off-site effects. Yet, here, too,
the zoning power could extend beyond harms that are otherwise actionable
in private law to regulate adverse market externalities.
II. THE REGULATION OF MARKET EXTERNALITIES
This Part moves to explore in more detail three settings in which zoning
and land use decisions may entail market externalities. It looks at the current
judicial approach to the validity of such considerations, pointing to hitherto
unobserved similarities between cases. This analysis leads to the
construction of a unified theory.
A.

Entry of Commercial Uses

Any type of land use regulation that places practical limits on
development may generate market externalities. In the housing context,
several authors have argued that restrictive regulation is the key variable that
explains increasing housing costs.154 Such market effects in the residential
context serve the interests of existing homeowners in high demand areas,
incentivizing them to influence the political and regulatory process.155
Because of the large number and dispersed nature of existing homeowners
and, even more so, of adversely affected end users (i.e., prospective buyers
and renters), controversies about land use decisions that restrict development
formally feature the developer, neighbors, and the local government as the
disputants.156 Local governments tend to rely in such cases on explicit
considerations embedded in the control of technological or fiscal
externalities, and judicial review determines the deference to such
considerations.157
Matters change, however, when the regulation implicates the entry of
commercial uses. The developer will usually have a financial stake in the
long-term profitability of the commercial use, for example, the retail
revenues that a big-box store would generate over time.158 At the other end,
154. See Edward L. Glaeser et al., Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up?, 95 AM. ECON.
REV. 329 (2005) (suggesting that the problem is not one of declining availability of land, but
rather one of tight regulation); John M. Quigley & Steven Raphael, Regulation and the High
Cost of Housing in California, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (2005) (arguing that regulation
increases housing costs in California). This is not to say, however, that such effects of
government intervention cannot be outweighed by overall positive results of measures such
as compact development. See, e.g., Jae Hong Kim, Linking Land Use Planning and
Regulation to Economic Development: A Literature Review, 26(1) J. PLAN. LIT. 35, 43 (2011).
155. FISCHEL, supra note 24, at § 5.24.
156. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 83-84.
157. Id. at 34-45.
158. Id. at 112-17.
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while some residents or interest groups may object to the project due to
environmental or fiscal externalities, current retailers or related businesses
would seek to play an explicit role given the potential market externalities
that the development entails. Even if courts deny standing to retailers made
anxious by competition, such stakeholders may seek to employ at least one
of two tactics: funding litigation for residents or groups with standing159 or
lobbying the government to protect their interests. In the latter case, if the
government supports such interests, it would typically tie its reservations to
general concerns over the economic viability of the relevant area or
industry.160
How should land use regulation draw the normative dividing line between
anticompetitive behavior, tailored to promote the particular interests of an
existing commercial user, and legitimate broad-based considerations of
market externalities? Market externalities should be evaluated along the
three dimensions presented above: (1) welfare effects; (2) distributive
concerns; (3) control of second-hand, off-site environmental/fiscal
externalities.161 Additionally, the need to rely on a broad-based issue in such
matters entails both economic and legal considerations.
From an economic perspective, market externalities are inherently the
manifestation of a change to a certain preexisting market-equilibrium.162
This change implicates numerous parties on both the supply and demand
sides. An understanding of the geographical scope and the kind of industries
affected by the entry of a commercial development cannot rely solely on
simple proxies, such as a fixed distance or estimated revenues per square
foot. The calculation goes well beyond a zero-sum game between existing
and future retailers. Evaluating the effects of market externalities requires
local governments to have a broader understanding of the commercial
activity that takes place within its area’s borders (and also outside of them,
as Section III.B shows) and how positive or negative market externalities
affect not only direct competitors but also related businesses. As suggested
above,163 the entry of a competing commercial use, such as a big-box retailer,
may have a very different effect on existing retailers than is the case with a
nearby complementary business, such as a restaurant.164
Moreover, from the point of view of aggregate welfare, a regulatory
analysis of market externalities—and the effect of a prospective
development on the economic viability of preexisting commercial

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 117.
Id.
See supra Section I.E.
Laffont, supra note 58.
See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
Shoag & Veuger, supra note 145.
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activities—requires the municipality to take a general stand on matters that
are at the basis of agglomeration economics. For example, does the city
place a special value on downtown business districts that feature a multitude
of small- and medium-scale retailers, or does it prefer retail economy
concentrated at its perimeter?
The same dilemmas also touch on the two other dimensions of market
externalities. A decision by a local government to prefer small- and mediumscale businesses to large-scale retailers because of distributive
considerations must consider the implications of a regulatory decision on
other small businesses that are not direct competitors of the prospective large
retailer and which may be generally better off situating themselves near such
big businesses.165 If the city wishes to differentiate between various types
of businesses in its distributive agenda—e.g., it seeks to preserve small
fashion stores but it is less concerned about protecting mom and pop
restaurants—it should not only offer a normatively valid reason for this
differential treatment of small businesses but also design its commercial
zones to achieve such a result. The same requirement for a broad policy
should apply to the control of second-hand environmental externalities or
fiscal effects. If the city is determined to decrease the prospects that its CBD
will become rundown, it should have an explicit policy on what types of
businesses are inherently essential for the economic viability of the CBD as
a whole or are particularly prone to market externalities.
From a legal perspective, a broad-based policy regulating the entry of
commercial uses, due to considerations of market externalities, is justified
because existing private-law mechanisms (such as nuisance law) may fail to
resolve certain types of externalities. As suggested earlier, the further away
one moves from land uses that may otherwise constitute a wrong in private
law, the greater the burden on the local government to ground its restrictions
in a broad-based policy.166 Of all externalities, market externalities are most
often reciprocal—Coase’s term—in identifying the normativity of the
conduct.167 Therefore, to the extent that a land use regulation limits the entry
of a commercial use because of market externalities, the regulation must
show how such a decision promotes Euclidean general welfare, in the most
genuine sense, and why such a decision is not merely a pretext for preserving
the status quo in the service of a politically powerful economic actor. Even
within the “substantial relation” deferential standard,168 a legal limit based
on market externalities must rely on a credible broad-based policy.

165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
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These insights may be instrumental in delineating the normative dividing
line between legally inadequate protectionism and a legitimate control of
market externalities, even if existing businesses may benefit from limits on
entry of commercial uses in both cases.
Consider, on the one hand, the legal controversy over zoning limits placed
on the entry of “formula businesses,” typified by a “standardized array of
services or merchandise, trademark, logo, service mark, symbol, decor,
architecture, layout, uniform, or similar standardized feature.”169 This term
seeks to capture major national retailers, such as Wal-Mart, McDonalds, or
Starbucks.
Numerous municipalities in the United States have placed limits on such
retailers, subjecting them to special permit procedures or economic impact
reviews.170 The reasons provided for such limits are usually grounded in
preserving an appropriate balance of small-, medium-, and large-scale
businesses, or in controlling other effects that such retailers may have on the
community.171
However, courts have scrutinized such regulations,
especially when similar limits were not placed on other large businesses that
do not have standardized features, meaning that the true motive for such
limits is a targeted policy against specific retailers, not a general policy on
the preservation of small businesses or the viability of the CBD.172 This
targeted policy in the guise of market externality analysis is especially
prominent in the context of Wal-Mart, where labor unions seek to use
municipal zoning regulations to prevent the entry of Wal-Mart stores.173
On the other hand, courts have been more deferential to zoning regulations
that are grounded in a broad-based policy. In Hernandez v. City of Hanford,
the California Supreme Court upheld a 2003 amendment to the city’s zoning
ordinance.174 Aimed at protecting the “economic viability of Hanford’s
downtown commercial district,” typified by a large number of “regionally
well-regarded retail furniture stores,” the original ordinance prohibited the

169. See Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844, 845 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quoting the language of Ordinance 02-02 §§ 6.4.3-4(a-b), adopted in 2002 by the City of
Islamorada, Florida).
170. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 120-21.
171. Id. at 121.
172. Island Silver & Spice, 542 F.3d at 847-49 (reasoning that the goal of preserving
Islamorada’s “small town” features does not stand if other large non-standardized retailers are
allowed, and holding that the special limits on formula retail violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause’s protection of interstate commerce).
173. ELLICKSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 121. See also Richard A. Epstein, On Wal-Mart:
Doing Good by Doing Nothing, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1287 (2007) (arguing that Wal-Mart, or
other big-box retailers, should not be singled out for special treatment and that they are not
immune to competitive pressures).
174. 159 P.3d 33 (Cal. 2007).
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sale of furniture in another commercial district, the “PC district.”175 The
amendment created a special exception for large department stores—those
with at least 50,000 square feet of floor space—located in the PC district,
allowing them to sell furniture within a specifically described area of no
more than 2500 square feet in the department store.176 In so doing, the
amendment sought to add to the original goal of preserving the economic
viability of the downtown commercial district a new goal of attracting the
“type of large department stores that the city views as essential to the
economic viability of the PC district.”177
The court viewed both goals as legitimate purposes and validated the
zoning measures taken to attain them. Surveying the history of the zoning
ordinance and its amendments, the court noted that, when the PC district was
established in the late 1980s, a city committee identified types of commercial
uses already established in the downtown district and which the city did not
want removed to the PC district. These uses included car dealerships, banks,
professional offices, and furniture stores.178
The court concluded that the zoning power extended to the regulation of
economic competition to advance a legitimate public goal.179 It held that a
zoning ordinance is not necessarily invalid because it has the effect of
limiting competition. Zoning actions in which the “regulation of economic
competition reasonably could be viewed as a direct and intended effect”
would be valid as long as the primary purpose is a “valid public purpose such
as furthering a municipality’s general plan . . . for localized commercial
development” rather than simply serving a business’s private
anticompetitive interests.180
Thus, for example, a city’s decision to limit the entry of discount
superstores and to organize its commercial development in existing
neighborhood shopping centers would be legitimate, even if it has a “direct
and intended effect of regulating competition.”181 Such zoning would be
valid as long as it serves legitimate purposes, such as maintaining the
“vitality and economic viability of the city’s neighborhood commercial
centers,” thus avoiding an “urban/suburban decay” that might result from the
shifting of commercial activity.182

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 35.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 35, 39-40.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 43-45.
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In this case, in working to preserve the downtown district, the City of
Hanford identified in advance the types of commercial uses that served as
the economic anchors of district.183 Similarly, the local government
identified department stores as the commercial anchor of the PC district and
ordered the types and scope of commercial land uses within the district.184
Therefore, the zoning ordinance did reflect a broad-based policy, not one
merely tailored to protect private revenue streams of specific stores. For
example, the Hanford zoning ordinance did nothing to limit the entry of new
furniture stores in the downtown district or new department stores in the PC
district.185 It did not limit the number of competitors, instead regulating their
spatial distribution. Hernandez exemplifies how an explicit consideration of
market externalities may be normatively legitimate when it relies on a broadbased policy.
B.

Renting Out Investment Property

The economic literature deals extensively with the market effects of
investment in real estate made for speculative purposes.186 Researchers have
tried to determine if real estate speculation is primarily a cause for or a
symptom of a property cycle, with one prominent study concluding that the
effects of speculation appear to be dominated by the price elasticity of the
housing supply.187 This means that markets with more responsive regulatory
environments or with less physical constraints on increasing housing supply
will experience lower price volatility, as well as less speculative behavior.188
An analysis of the U.S. real estate housing market and its price fluctuations
between 1960 and 2011 suggests that the pre-2000 era was dominated by
periodic “intrinsic bubbles,” with buyers overreacting to changes in the costs
of renting.189 In contrast, the post-2000 period is dominated by “rational
speculative bubbles” in which buyers cease to be influenced by underlying
fundamental market factors and, instead, become “fixated on nonlinearly
extrapolating the historical growth in housing prices” and attempt to guess
future trends by looking at past price trajectories.190
183. Id.
184. Id. at 45-46.
185. Id.
186. A speculative investment refers to the purchase of an asset that is driven primarily by
its anticipated resale value rather than by intent for ongoing use. Ngai Pindell, Home Sweet
Home? The Efficacy of Rental Restrictions to Promote Neighborhood Stability, 29 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 41, 66 (2009).
187. Stephen Malpezzi & Susan M. Wachter, The Role of Speculation in Real Estate
Cycles, 13 J. REAL EST. LIT. 141 (2005).
188. Id. at 157-60.
189. Ogonna Nneji et al., Intrinsic and Rational Speculative Bubbles in the U.S. Housing
Market: 1960-2011, 35 J. REAL EST. RES. 121, 135-47 (2013).
190. Id. at 147.
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At the local level, such property investment—if it reaches a critical
mass—creates market externalities at both ends of the price fluctuations.
When the market is dominated by investors and prices go up precipitously,
existing homeowners stand to gain, but potential households seeking to enter
the municipality for long-term residency may be left out. Adversely, when
the bubble crashes—as in the subprime crisis—current homeowners are also
adversely affected by the sharp decrease.191 This is especially so when highleverage property investments end up in foreclosure. In addition to
environmental externalities resulting from vacancies and neglect of
distressed assets, which may then translate into lower prices for adjacent
properties,192 some authors attribute foreclosure externalities to a supply
effect by which nearby foreclosure increases competition among sellers, thus
leading to lower transaction prices for adjacent non-distressed properties.193
Although foreclosures are not unique to investment properties, speculative
buyers tend to be particularly footloose when the asset’s net value goes
below their cash contribution.194
Assuming that a certain municipality concludes that a high rate of
investment-based housing unit acquisition might create adverse market
externalities, what measures can it take to mitigate this phenomenon through
its land use regulation powers? A flat prohibition on investment-driven
purchases or other measures directly targeting a certain group of purchasers,
such as differential real estate transfer tax rates, would exceed the authority
of municipalities.195 Such measures may prove constitutionally problematic
even when taken by state or federal governments.196 Municipalities must
thus find ways that focus on the land use rather than chiefly on the identity
of the user and that are reasonably related to the goal of increasing market
stability.

191. Pindell, supra note 186, at 44.
192. See Kristopher Gerardi et al., Foreclosure Externalities: New Evidence, 87 J. URB.
ECON. 42 (2015) (arguing that the measured price spillovers are physical externalities caused
by a lack of property maintenance and not pecuniary externalities that reflect local supply or
demand shocks).
193. See Elliot Anenberg & Edward Kung, Estimates of the Size and Source of Price
Declines Due to Nearby Foreclosures, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2527 (2014) (acknowledging also
the effect of nearby disamenities).
194. Jeff Crump et al., Cities Destroyed (Again) for Cash: Forum on the U.S. Foreclosure
Crisis, 29 URB. GEOGRAPHY 745, 767-68 (2008) (showing this phenomenon in the minority
neighborhood of North Minneapolis).
195. Cf. Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 799 A.2D 599, 608 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002) (holding that the state legislature did not grant localities the power to deny
or regulate a property owner’s right to rent non-owner occupied housing in order to alter the
“community’s dynamics and demographics”).
196. The variety of potential legal challenges to such prohibitions may include claims
about takings and violation of procedural or substantive due process. See Pindell, supra note
186, at 77-80.
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One technique that may be used for this purpose is to regulate the scope
and manner of renting out housing units in the municipality, such as by
putting a cap on the overall number of rental properties or establishing rules
of use that would limit short-term rentals.197 As for the latter, the use of
consecutive short-term rentals has gained currency among investors over the
past few years, especially with the introduction of web platforms such as
Airbnb.198 One clear and probably uncontroversial way to control short-term
rentals would be to clarify the distinction between housing and hotel uses in
the zoning ordinance.199 Yet, cities might need to resort to other measures
to control against the broader market externalities that result from investment
property.
As the following paragraphs show, lessons learned from the limited case
law on such rental restrictions indicate that a broadly applied ordinance,
intended to alleviate market externalities, is more likely to withstand judicial
scrutiny than an individually applied measure. Similar to the discussion in
Sections I.E and II.A in the context of regulating the entry of commercial
uses,200 the need for a broad-based policy relies on both economics and law.
Consider two state cases. In Gangemi v. Zoning Board of Appeals of
Fairfield, the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated the conditioning of a
variance to the zoning ordinance’s setback requirements on prohibiting the
applicants from renting out their beach property.201 The zoning board
grounded its condition in the “uniqueness” of the beach property.202 The
board argued that this ban would promote “the public health of the
neighborhood” as well as its “general welfare” and would “conserve the
value of the buildings located in the neighborhood.”203
Holding that restrictions on the free alienation of property are not upheld
“unless they serve a legal and useful purpose,” the court noted that the
proposed limitation did “not adhere to the rest of the property owners in the
beach district.”204 Such a disparity “gives those other property owners a
grossly unfair advantage over the plaintiffs in the marketplace.”205 Put in
197. See Pindell, supra note 186, at 50-57.
198. For this burgeoning phenomenon, see, e.g., Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the
Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry, SSRN (2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898
[https://perma.cc/XK5F73Q5].
199. See, e.g., Juliane Pepitone, Judge Rules Airbnb Illegal in New York City, CNN MONEY
(May 21, 2013, 12:49 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/21/technology/innovation/airbnbillegal-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/946E-DKHU].
200. See supra Sections I.E., II.A.
201. 763 A.2d 1011, 1016-18 (Conn. 2011).
202. Id. at 1014 n.8.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1016-17.
205. Id. at 1017.
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other terms, imposing a restriction on a single property would not “conserve
the value of the buildings located in the neighborhood,”206 because renting it
out would not create any change to the market equilibrium. From a legal
perspective, the court found unjustified the singling out of such faultless
behavior—to the extent that what is at stake is only a market externality.207
In contrast, in the recent Dean v. City of Winona case, the Minnesota Court
of Appeals held that a municipal ordinance, limiting to thirty percent the
number of lots on a block eligible to obtain certification as a rental property,
was a valid exercise of the city’s police power and did not violate the
appellants’ constitutional rights.208 The explicit problem resulting from the
previous overabundance of rental properties was a shortage in parking—a
technological and fiscal externality—and the cure provided by the
amendment was to apply the thirty percent quota to blocks within designated
city districts.209 The court concluded that the “public has a sufficient interest
in rental housing to justify a municipality’s use of police power as a means
of regulating such housing.”210 It held that the application of the cap through
the districts’ blocks and the fact that rental certifications are awarded on a
“first-come first-served basis” preclude constitutional arguments concerning
equal protection or due process violations.211 Since “the owners of certified
rental properties do not determine which other lots may be certified”212 and
the “30% cap was adopted after long-deliberate information gathering
process,” the court rejected the arguments about protectionism in the guise
of policy.213
While the City of Winona’s ordinance was concerned mostly with the
control of technological or environmental and fiscal externalities resulting
from congestion, a similar zoning ordinance might instead seek to control
the potential market externalities resulting from the over-abundance of
investment property. This does not mean, of course, that all municipalities
would necessarily consider investment property as generating adverse
market effects. Many municipalities in the United States pride themselves
on being magnets to wealthy investors. For example, foreign magnates
purchase multi-million dollar units in Manhattan’s high-end condominiums,

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 1013 n.8.
Id. at 1015-16.
843 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 254.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 261.
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which they rarely set foot in, with New York City facilitating such
acquisitions.214
Yet many other decision makers may come to a different conclusion about
the desirability of property investment within their respective
jurisdictions.215 The massive presence of investors, especially those who
look for a quick profit on resale and who, in the meantime, engage in
consecutive short-term leases, might generate market externalities that could
have both aggregate welfare and distributive effects. This may also result in
second-hand environmental externalities if a market crash will lead to mass
foreclosures. To the extent that a municipality’s policy relies on a broadbased view of its real estate market, and subsequent zoning measures are not
applied on an ad hoc basis or otherwise used to single out homeowners, such
measures should be considered legitimate.
C.

Inclusionary Zoning and Market Nexus

Section I.D discussed inclusionary zoning and how the California
Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in California Building Industry Association
v. City of San Jose216 validated the requirement for on-site, below-marketrate units to promote the positive social externalities of mixed-income
neighborhoods.217 In addition to facilitating positive social externalities,
inclusionary zoning can also control market externalities generated by new
developments.
To understand what types of market externalities may exist in the case of
new residential projects, and how inclusionary zoning requirements may
work to internalize such externalities, consider the following legislative
findings from San Jose’s inclusionary zoning ordinance, cited by the
California Supreme Court in its decision:
New residents of market-rate housing place demands on services provided
by both public and private sectors, creating a demand for new employees.
Some of these public and private sector employees needed to meet the
needs of the new residents earn incomes only adequate to pay for affordable
housing. Because affordable housing is in short supply in the city, such
employees may be forced to live in less than adequate housing within the
city, pay a disproportionate share of their incomes to live in adequate
housing in the city, or commute ever increasing distances to their jobs from

214. See, e.g., Louise Story & Stephanie Saul, Stream of Foreign Wealth Flows to Elite
New York Real Estate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015
/02/08/nyregion/stream-of-foreign-wealth-flows-to-time-warner-condos.html
[https://perma.cc/BR7V-UF5L]. For a detailed theoretical analysis of this phenomenon, see
Amnon Lehavi, Property and Secrecy, 50 REAL PROP., TR, & EST. L.J. 381, 382-84 (2016).
215. See Pindell, supra note 186, at 65-68.
216. 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015).
217. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
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housing located outside the city. These circumstances harm the city’s
ability to attain employment and housing goals articulated in the city’s
general plan and place strains on the city’s ability to accept and service new
market-rate housing development.218

Put in simple terms: the development of market-rate units brings in new
households to the city. The households use their income to consume goods
and services. This additional consumption translates into new jobs. Many
of these jobs, such as in the retail, restaurant, and health-care industries, are
low-compensation jobs. This results in new low-income households unable
to afford market-rate housing units in the city219 and creates an aggregate
“affordability gap” embedded in market conditions.220 Because developers
generate market externalities, which operate through the price system, they
should internalize them by providing below-market units or paying in lieu
fees.221 This establishes a market nexus that should be regulated by
inclusionary zoning.
The California Supreme Court did not explicitly address this type of
market externality logic. It reasoned, instead, that the City of San Jose could
promote a legitimate goal of “increasing the number of affordable housing
units in the city in recognition of the insufficient number of existing
affordable housing units” and that the zoning measures should only establish
a general “reasonable relationship” to such a goal.222 However, this section
expands the market externality logic, showing how it could be tied to the
state’s broad land use policy.
Since 1980, California has required each local jurisdiction to plan for its
share of the state’s housing need for households of all income levels. Under
this “Housing Element Law,”223 localities are required to adopt the housing
elements as part of their general plans, which should account for both
existing and projected housing needs, and to submit such housing elements
for state certification.224 The Regional Housing Need Allocation (“RHNA”)
is the state-mandated process that identifies, for each eight-year period, the
total number of housing units that each municipality must accommodate in

218. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 982 (quoting San Jose, Cal., Mun. Code §
5.08.010 F).
219. See Keyser Marston Associates, Residential Nexus Analysis: San Jose, California 1,
6 (Oct. 2014), http://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/32877 [https://perma.cc/
NQK3-PS72].
220. Id. at 38.
221. Id. at 4-6, 37-38.
222. Cal. Bldg Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 979, 987.
223. CAL GOV’T CODE § 65580 (Deering 2017).
224. See CAL. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., Regional Housing Need Allocation and
Housing
Elements,
http://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housingelement/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/U59C-VYZJ].
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its housing element.225 In the first stage, the state Department of Housing
and Community Development determines the total housing needs, by
affordability level, for each region in the state. Then, each regional “council
of governments” is tasked with distributing these needs to local
governments.226
Such regional and local RHNA allocations are divided into four income
categories that encompass all levels of housing affordability: “very low” (up
to fifty percent of the Area Median Income (“AMI”)); “low” (fifty-one to
eighty percent of AMI); “moderate” (81-120% of AMI); and “above
moderate” (above 120% of AMI).227 “Once the municipality receives its
RHNA allocation, it must update the housing element of its general plan to
show how it plans to meet the housing needs in its community.”228
Importantly, the RHNA is a zoning requirement, meaning that cities must
ensure their zoning schemes can accommodate the mandated housing
elements, not that they actually produce those housing units.229 This
distinction is essential both legally and practically. While in some cases
reluctant localities have been sued for failing to meet their RHNA zoning
requirements, in most cases, zoning ordinances allow for a sufficient amount
of housing, but the actual development is not completed.230 This
development gap occurs predominantly in all affordability levels below
“above moderate” market-rate development. This is due to constant
defunding by the federal government for the “very low” housing
programs,231 recent changes at the state level—such as the 2012 abolition of
redevelopment agencies and Tax Increment Financing (“TIF”) programs that

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See ASS’N OF BAY AREA GOV’TS (ABAG), Regional Housing Need Plan: San
Francisco Bay Area: 2014-2022, 1, http://www.abag.ca.gov/planning/housingneeds/pdfs/
2014-22_RHNA_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/URR8-YZ5Q]. The current RHNA covers the
period between 2014 and 2022, and it has required all localities to update their general plans
by early 2015. Id.
229. Interview with Glen Campora, Paul McDougal, Anda Draghici, and Melinda Coy,
California Dept. of Hous. and Cmty. Dev., in Sacramento, Cal. (July 24, 2014).
230. Interview with Joshua Abrams, Baird + Driskell Cmty. Plan., in Berkeley, Cal. (June
13, 2014).
231. Interview with Hing Wong and Gillian Adams, Ass’n of Bay Area Gov’t, in Oakland,
Cal. (May 29, 2014).
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had dedicated considerable funds to affordable housing232—and local
political and financial obstacles to development.233
Inclusionary zoning schemes are therefore intended to bridge the gap
between formal zoning for residential uses and the creation of mechanisms
that will enable the actual development of affordable units across all income
categories (based on the proposition that households should not spend over
thirty percent of their income on housing costs).234 More than 170 localities
in California already adopted such schemes, offering different mixtures of
inclusionary zoning alternatives including on-site units, off-site units, in lieu
fees, dedication of land, or rehabilitation of existing affordable housing.235
The choice of the inclusionary zoning mechanisms may implicate both the
legal standard that would apply to such zoning measures and the technique
used to quantify the scope of market externalities created by the market-rate
developments. It should be noted that the California Supreme Court’s
embrace of the deferential standard in San Jose was based on the conclusion
that limiting the sale price of fifteen percent of the on-site units constitutes
nothing more than a regulation of land use, within the scope of the city’s
police power.236
The legal standard may be, however, somewhat different for inclusionary
zoning schemes that focus on market-rate rental projects or on the increasing
tendency of California cities to embrace a mechanism of straight fees, instead
of in lieu fees—thus allowing the city to support unit production independent
of the given project for which the fee is assessed.237 If a city establishes a
legislative formula for a fee, whether explicitly defined as a mitigation fee
covered under the Mitigation Fee Act238 or otherwise substantially intended

232. Interview with Charles Bryant, Dir., Plan. and Bldg. Env’t, City of Emeryville, Cal.
(June 9, 2014); interview with Norma Thompson, Dept. of Hous. and Cmty. Dev., and Alicia
Parker, Dept. of Planning, City of Oakland (June 19, 2014). For the role of redevelopment
agencies and TIFs in the financing of affordable housing, and the reasons for the dissolution
of these agencies in 2012, see Mac Taylor, The 2012-13 Budget: Unwinding Redevelopment,
LEGIS.
ANALYST’S
OFF.
(Feb
17,
2012),
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis
/2012/general_govt/unwinding-redevelopment-021712.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B92-AQKW].
233. Interview with Eric Angstadt, Dir. of Planning, City of Berkeley (June 13, 2014).
234. This general benchmark for affordability guides both federal and state governments.
See Affordable Housing, HUD, https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/
comm_planning/affordablehousing/ [https://perma.cc/W9VA-TECP].
235. California Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 977, 983-84 (Cal.
2015).
236. Id. at 987-88.
237. For a review of the entangled legal landscape prior to the San Jose ruling, see generally
Andrew L. Faber, Inclusionary Housing Requirements: Still Possible?, LEAGUE OF CAL.
CITIES (2014), http://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Member-Engagement/Profes
sional-Departments/City-Attorneys/Library/2014/2014-Annual/9-2015-Annual-AndrewFaber-Inclusionary-Housing-Re.aspx [https://perma.cc/VWS5-5VHM].
238. CAL GOV’T CODE § 66001.

2017]

ZONING & MARKET EXTERNALITIES

397

to offset the social costs of a project, it has to show a “reasonable relationship
between the fee’s use and the type of development project on which the fee
is imposed.”239 A fee established legislatively in a zoning ordinance would
not be subject to the Nollan/Dolan strict standard for ad hoc exactions,
because it is not tied to the particular effects of a specific project but, rather,
to the usual effects that such types of projects generate. On the other hand,
the “reasonable relationship” is more demanding than the general standard
that applies to the exercise of the police power, which looks more generally
at the public goal.240
To meet the “reasonable relationship” standard that applies to the
legislative setting of a fee channeled to affordable housing, cities in
California are increasingly engaging in a “nexus” study, seeking to show the
generic market effect of market-rate developments on low-compensation
employees who enter the job market and must now search for housing.241
These nexus studies clearly focus on market externalities. These studies do
not deal with technological or environmental externalities or with fiscal ones.
They do not focus on the project-specific effects of the development but on
its general ones by establishing the projects’ statistical share in the overall
market effect.242
For example, a nexus study, prepared for the City of San Jose in 2014,
showed support for a new legislative scheme for fees imposed on developers
of market-rate rental projects (thus not covered under the 2010 ordinance
upheld by the California court).243 The study’s methodology relied on the
Impact Analysis for Planning (“IMPLAN”) model, which quantified the
effects of changes in a local economy, including impacts of changes in
income on employment.244 In essence, the study worked in modules of one
hundred market-rate housing units built by the developer. It calculated the
overall free income of such market-rate households and its impact on job
creation in the local economy. It then identified the types of new jobs
created, including low- and modest-income jobs, and the “affordability gap”
that exists for new worker households that require subsidies or other forms
of public assistance to afford housing in or around the community. The

239. Id. at § 66001a(3) (emphasis added).
240. Faber, supra note 237, at 8-9.
241. ADAM F. CRAY, THE USE OF RESIDENTIAL NEXUS ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF
CALIFORNIA’S INCLUSIONARY HOUSING ORDINANCES: A CRITICAL EVALUATION - A REPORT
TO THE CALIFORNIA HOMEBUILDING FOUNDATION (Nov. 2011), http://www.cbia.org/uploads
/5/1/2/6/51268865/residential_nexus_analysis_in_support_of_california_complete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PF38-9J4F].
242. Id. at 9-15.
243. Keyser Marston Associates, supra note 219.
244. IMPLAN is a commercially available economic model and database. See IMPLAN,
http://www.implan.com/ [https://perma.cc/3BPH-LKPK].
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overall amount of public expenditures required to close the “affordability
gap” is then broken-down to 1/100 shares to calculate the fee imposed on
each market-rate unit.245
This type of market nexus analysis is embraced throughout California,
although localities regularly establish the fee at a lower threshold than the
maximum.246 San Mateo County conducted, in 2015, a comprehensive
nexus analysis for twenty-one localities.247 With the tailwind provided by
the recent San Jose case, more localities may follow suit.
The key lesson provided by this methodology is how the economic nexus
study is translated into a regulatory and legal framework. Developers and,
through them, market-rate households are required to account for the market
externalities they generate. This mechanism is inherently based on a broad
analysis. It does not—and cannot—attribute an “earmarked” market
externality to a single unit. It is based on a system of statistical extrapolation
and then distribution. This is understandable from an economic perspective
because market changes are a result of aggregate changes in supply and
demand. A single household does not create a discernible market change in
housing. The aggregation of new residential developments does create such
a change.
From a legal perspective, the use of a broad-based formula to calculate the
individual fee representing a market-rate unit’s pro rata contribution to the
market externality is sound policy. It does not single out a developer or a
245. Keyser Marston Associates, supra note 219. The analysis followed a number of
stages. First, the study identified rental prototypes that represent typical private, market-rate
rental projects in San Jose and the current rental rates for average units in such projects.
Second, average household income was determined from the rent levels, based on the
assumption that market-rate renters spend thirty percent of their income on rent. To simplify
the calculation, the analysis was then conducted on one hundred unit project modules. Third,
the IMPLAN-based model linked these incremental annual household expenditures for the
households in the one hundred market-rate units into job creation in the local economy. The
model identified those jobs that serve new residents directly, such as supermarkets, those that
serve businesses that serve residents, such as wholesalers, and jobs generated when these new
employees spend their own wages in the local economy. The study then accumulated the
number of new worker households expected in the city, recognizing that there is, on average,
more than one worker per household. Fourth, these new worker households were then
distributed via the model to the four income categories (very low; low; moderate; above
moderate). The model then identified the average subsidy needed to provide affordable
housing for each income category (such subsidy being referred to as the “affordability gap”
in each income category). The model then summed up the overall affordability gap costs for
each income category. Finally, when the affordability gap conclusions for each income
category were linked to the overall amount of affordable housing required as a result of the
market-rate development and were then divided by one hundred units, the result was the total
nexus cost per new market-rate residential unit. Such a fee can be further divided and
expressed in dollars per market-rate square foot. Either way, this nexus analysis establishes
the maximum fee. Id.
246. Interview with Eric Angstadt, supra note 233.
247. Interview with Joshua Abrams, supra note 230.

2017]

ZONING & MARKET EXTERNALITIES

399

unit owner for their individual generation of a market externality. It
identifies, rather, the typical market externality that such projects generate
and entrenches it in a legislative formula that does not favor specific
developers or land users over others. In so doing, this broad-based scheme
should be seen as meeting the legal standard of reasonable relationship
between the “fee’s use and the type of development project on which the fee
is imposed.”248 It seeks to capture a broad economic phenomenon and
regulate it through zoning power.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MARKET-BASED ZONING
This Part consolidates the lessons learned from the cases presented in Part
II and offers a general framework for legitimizing the broad-based regulation
of market externalities. It then addresses an important contingency: interlocal market externalities. This Part argues that local governments should
be held accountable for the market externalities that their zoning decisions
generate on other localities, whenever such effects contradict the broadbased policy that the city embraces to control its own intra-local market
externalities.
A.

Consistency with Overall Land Use Policy

Previous Parts laid the foundation for identifying market externalities
resulting from land use and explained how zoning and other regulatory
decisions could account for dimensions of aggregate welfare, distribution,
and second-hand off-site technological or fiscal externalities embedded in
market externalities.249 While there may be room for debate about the
analysis of potential market externalities and the respective conclusions in
contexts such as the entry of commercial uses, renting out of investment
property, or inclusionary zoning, the control of market externalities should
be explicitly recognized as a legitimate basis for zoning power.
At the same time, the need to tie the level of judicial review to the breadth
and scope of the local-land use policy plays a prominent role in the context
of market externalities. The distinction between legislative or broad-based
policy and ad hoc or adjudicative decision making goes beyond
considerations of rule of law, democratic accountability, and the need for
occasional flexibility that regularly implicate land use law and policy.250 The
need to have a citywide, or at least an industry-wide, analysis prior to
regulation touches on the very foundations of identifying the existence of a
248. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
249. See discussion supra Sections I.E, II.A, II.B, II.C.
250. Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 90, at 34-46. See also Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The
Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the
Administrative State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133, 178-212 (2014) (surveying the tradeoff between
general versus specific permit-design in various contexts).
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market externality and of normatively justifying the control over such
potential effects through zoning rules.
From an economic perspective, a market externality is a process in which
a certain market-equilibrium undergoes a change through the price
system.251 As such, it conventionally implicates numerous parties on both
the supply and demand sides. This is the case when one examines the effects
of a new commercial project on other businesses and consumers, the price
effects of investment properties on the rental or sales market, or the influence
of new residential market-rate projects on the local job market and
consequently on the entry of low- and modest-income workers in need of
housing.252
This means that in most cases, a single development will not generate any
type of market externality, but it might contribute to such a change in
conjunction with other contemporaneous projects, resulting in a critical mass
that creates a new equilibrium.253 When this is the case, identifying a market
externality or designing an adequate regulatory response (whether through a
limit on land use, quota setting, or a fee system) needs to be completed within
a broader picture of the changing landscape of the city.
Indeed, there may be cases in which a single development could generate
a market externality. This would be so especially in the case of a big-box
retailer, such as a Wal-Mart.254 Here too, however, a market analysis would
require a broad analysis of the entire array of affected businesses and, more
generally, of the policy choice between downtown business districts and
spread-out retailers.255 An economic analysis based on agglomeration
effects, or even on distributive concerns, would make little sense without a
general policy on retail. These settings are therefore materially different
from purely anticompetitive motives, such as when a single grocery store
objects to a variance to set up a new grocery store on the other side of the
street—with no discernible broader effects.256
From a legal perspective, the generation of a market externality should be
considered blameless conduct, with no clear division between wrongdoer
and victim. This is unlike some cases of environmental externalities, in
which the normative basis of regulation lies in identifying a party who
creates a conflict (even if such an action is not proscribed as a nuisance or

251. See supra text accompanying notes 131-37.
252. See discussion of the various types of market externalities supra Part II.
253. Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 142, at 237.
254. Shoag & Veuger, supra note 145, at 4.
255. See discussion supra Section II.A, about the entry of new commercial uses into cities.
256. Cf. Holcombe & Sobel, supra note 132, at 305 (suggesting that a Burger King wishing
to open up next door to a McDonalds should not compensate the owners of McDonalds for
the pecuniary externalities it may inflict).
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another private law wrong)257 or a fiscal externality, in which new public
expenses must be incurred.258 As a matter of policy, individuals and firms
should be encouraged to act in the market, promote competition and
innovation, and otherwise stimulate the economy.259 There are cases in
which considerations of agglomeration effects, distribution, or the possibility
of second-hand externalities may justify the regulation of land uses intended
for such an activity.260 However, these limits are not based on an initial
normative judgment about the wrongful nature of the activity.
In contrast, no individual party can be viewed as legally entitled to block
such an economic activity because this would infringe a legally recognized
right or immunity from a change to the status quo.261 A retailer has no vested
right not to have competition around it or to be compensated for such
competition. A homeowner has no individual entitlement to prevent others
from investing in real estate in her neighborhood. A low-income employee
has no direct cause of action, or even a principled normative claim, against
a market-rate household that generates demand for her services. In all of
these cases, the justification for regulation lies in a general evaluation of the
effects of a change to the market-equilibrium. As such, its legal validation
must be based on a broad policy. These observations do not preclude the
possibility that in some cases, the regulation of a market externality must go
beyond fixed formulas to provide a proper solution. The physical location
of a big-box store, the type of products it is selling, and the composition of
preexisting businesses may change across different scenarios, and would
accordingly affect the identification of the market externality and the
measures of control.262 This type of required flexibility should not be
equated, however, with ad hoc decision making, which attempts both to
identify the problem and to cure it solely on a case-specific basis.263
Conversely, in the case of technological or environmental or fiscal
externalities, there could be cases in which an ad hoc analysis would be
problematic, but, at the least, it would be based on some initial normative
baseline that identifies the cause of the externality and its anticipated
consequences.264 The Nollan/Dolan framework, which requires localities
that make ad hoc land use decisions to illustrate an “essential nexus” and
“rough proportionality” between the development and its adverse

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.C.
Holcombe & Sobel, supra note 132, at 304-06.
See supra Part II.
Holcombe & Sobel, supra note 132, at 305.
Shoag & Veuger, supra note 145.
Fennell & Peñalver, supra note 90, at 312-14.
See supra Section I.B.
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consequences,265 inherently assumes that such an analysis of the cause and
the cure can be made on an individual basis. In the case of a market
externality, this assumption does not work. When a market externality is
concerned, the “substantial relation” or “reasonable relationship” tests, while
generally more lenient, may prove the only feasible way for courts to address
the legal validity of zoning mechanisms intended to address market
externalities.266 Such a legal standard provides relief to the local government
by releasing it from having to identify a market externality that can be
attributed to a specific project. At the same time, this standard also places a
burden of persuasion on the local government. The city must demonstrate
that the zoning rationale conforms to its broad policy and would be applied
elsewhere in the city.
Finally, one should consider the role of zoning decisions, and the legal
standard that should apply to their review, when such decisions seek to focus
on the generation of positive market externalities, rather than merely on
preventing or mitigating negative market externalities resulting from new
development.
The discussion of positive market externalities requires even more
differentiation between private law entitlements and the legitimacy of land
use regulation than is the case with adverse market externalities. The law of
restitution usually does not entitle a benefactor to require payment or another
kind of compensation from beneficiaries-in-fact, including when a developer
carries out a project that provides unsolicited positive externalities.267 A
neighbor cannot be held liable for a self-serving activity by another
landowner that incidentally improves the neighbor’s land, even when the
monetary value of the benefit is easily measured.268 This principle also
applies when the benefit stems directly from a specific land use regulation,
such as when a developer is required, as a condition for approving her
subdivision map, to construct an additional road, which ensures that a
neighboring landlocked property would gain access to the nearest
thoroughfare.269

265. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
267. See generally Green Tree Est. v. Furstenberg, 124 N.W.2d 90 (Wis. 1963) (holding
that a developer was not entitled to recover from a neighbor for voluntary construction of
street improvement, curbs, and gutters).
268. See, e.g., Ulmer v. Farnsworth, 15 A. 65 (Me. 1888) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim
for recovery after their pumping of water from their own quarry unavoidably drained water
from the defendant’s quarry). See also Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment § 2(e) (Discussion Draft 2000).
269. See generally Dinosaur Dev. v. White, 265 Cal. Rptr. 525, 526 (Ct. App. 1989)
(rejecting the restitution-based claim of a developer against his neighbor under such
circumstances).
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The reasons for private law’s reluctance to require beneficiaries to
contribute to the internalization of positive externalities lie in considerations
of autonomy and preference for pre-activity agreements, especially if the
activity is sufficiently profitable for its doer, so that the “free riding” by the
beneficiary will not undermine the activity altogether.270 Authors have also
pointed to other dimensions of asymmetry between benefits and harms,
including the nature of scope of the potential effects in the absence of private
law rules.271
Yet, regardless of the arguments against restitution in the private law
context, zoning and other types of land use regulation are entitled to take into
account the positive externalities that a proposed project may entail and
should aim at maximizing such social benefits in order to promote the local
“general welfare.”272
Consider the following hypothetical. A city wants to introduce more retail
activity within its jurisdiction. For this purpose, the city considers rezoning
for commercial use one of two agricultural or currently undeveloped areas
located in different parts of the city. After a careful study, it concludes that,
all other things being equal, rezoning Area A would generate more positive
market externalities for adjacent businesses and households, as compared
with Area B, because of geographic and other considerations. Assume
further that the city concludes that rezoning both areas simultaneously would
result in excess commercial development, which could end in a massive
closing down of businesses. A decision to approve the rezoning of Area A,
based on the analysis of such positive market externalities, should be
considered legally valid. This would be so even if such a decision stands to
benefit the current landowners of Area A over those of Area B, provided that
retail developers could purchase land in Area A.
The more difficult issue is how to balance positive market externalities
with the developer’s self-interests, if these two components are not perfectly
aligned. The municipality may have to offer developer incentives to ensure
optimal land use. Consider again the city’s hypothetical case. Assume now
that the same developer owns both Area A and Area B in their entirety. The

270. See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 130-45 (2004) (stressing
the importance of restitution in solving free riding scenarios when the respective parties’
interests are genuinely locked in).
271. See, e.g., Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested
Benefits, 108 MICH. L. REV. 189, 199 (2009) (arguing that in the case of harm, without
regulation or internalization, “there would be no restriction whatsoever on injurers’ harmful
activities,” whereas no such risk exists in the case of benefits because, at worst, the level of
positive externalities would fall to zero).
272. Referring to the underlying rationale of promoting the “general welfare” through the
zoning power, articulated in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388
(1926).
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developer would actually prefer to develop Area B, because it is
geographically closer than Area A to the seaport through which the
developer imports its retail products, meaning that the developer would save
on transportation costs if Area B is developed. Assume further that the sum
of the developer’s savings on transportation costs in Area B is smaller than
the difference in positive market externalities in favor of Area A. However,
because the developer cannot internalize the positive market externalities it
is generating (assume that such externalities are not reciprocal), it will prefer
to rezone Area B over Area A. What the city could do in such a case is to
offer the developer a density bonus for developing Area A.
This decision should be anchored in a broad policy, by which the city
incentivizes developers that generate positive market externalities. If the
societal costs, including environmental costs resulting from increased
density, do not outweigh the overall benefits from rezoning Area A over
Area B, such a zoning decision should be considered both economically
sensible and legally valid. Localities should accordingly extend explicit
considerations of market externalities to facilitate positive externalities,
instead of just controlling against negative ones.
B.

Intergovernmental Market Externalities

The analysis so far assumes that both positive and negative market
externalities fall within the boundaries of a single local government, which
can then act to control or facilitate them through its power to regulate land
use. In reality, however, all types of land use related externalities may, and
often do, spill over across municipal boundaries.273
This could be the case with technological or environmental externalities,
such as when a zoning decision enables the construction of a factory in City
A that results in pollution that reaches City B.274 Fiscal externalities may
also cross municipal borders. For example, a busy commercial hub located
in the outskirts of City A could increase congestion in nearby transportation
arteries located in City B, requiring the latter to undertake public
expenditures.275 Social externalities may also cross municipal borders, such
as when exclusionary zoning practices of wealthy suburbs pass the burden
of accommodating low- and modest-income families to the nearby central
city.276
Market externalities are no exception. Rezoning land for a big-box
retailer located in City A might positively or negatively affect the market

273. Shoag & Veuger, supra note 145.
274. For the prevalence of this phenomenon, see Lehavi, supra note 9, at 931-32, 940-48.
275. See Lehavi, supra note 9, at 931-32, 940-48.
276. GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS
76-85 (1999).
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performance not only of existing businesses in the CBD of City A but also
that of adjacent businesses located in City B.277 Similarly, the abundance
of investment properties in one city may affect market prices in another
municipality, when the two localities are part of the same metropolitan area,
meaning that prospective homebuyers and renters view them as a single realestate market.278 Finally, the entry of new market-rate residential projects
and their residents’ resulting demand for low-compensated service workers
may affect housing needs and potential affordability gaps in all the
municipalities located within commuting distance to these workplaces.279
The analysis of the challenge of inter-local market externalities is based
on the following principles. First, it identifies why political and fiscal
considerations operate differently for zoning decisions entailing intra-local
externalities than those that generate inter-local effects. Second, it explains
the normative foundations of limiting cities in generating foreseeable interlocal externalities when such decisions contradict their established policy for
controlling against intra-local externalities. Third, it offers preliminary
thoughts on potential mechanisms for facilitating positive intergovernmental
market externalities.
When the negative and positive market externalities of a proposed
development are concentrated in a single jurisdiction, political and fiscal
reasons may drive the municipality to account for such externalities.280 A
spread-out big-box development project entailing significant adverse
externalities for existing businesses in the CBD might result in political
discontent by local business owners, their employees, and those who
otherwise value a thriving CBD. While the balance of political influence
changes across projects, there is some sense of political accountability in
such settings.281 From a fiscal perspective, market externalities might result
in lower property taxes—or even in an effective loss thereof in the case of
foreclosure or long-lasting vacancies—or in a drop in sales tax revenues

277. Shoag & Veuger, supra note 145.
278. Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, The Economics of Place-Making Policies,
PAPERS
ON
ECON.
POL’Y,
155,
158-68,
(Spring
2008),
BROOKINGS
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/2008a_bpea_glaeser.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J5NZ-K68N].
279. One example is the San Joaquin Valley in central California, a mixed rural and urban
area, which provides housing for low-income workers employed in affluent Bay Area cities.
Interview with Glen Campora, Paul McDougal, Anda Draghici, and Melinda Coy, supra note
229.
280. Lehavi, supra note 9, at 941.
281. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1131-35
(1996) (arguing that “exit” and “voice” options of constituents constrain local government’s
inefficient decision making).
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when CBD businesses experience a decrease in proceeds.282 This makes
local governments internalize some of the adverse market externalities and
generally motivates them to consider, upfront, the overall effects of a
proposed project.
In contrast, when adverse market externalities fall outside the boundaries
of the local government, there are no obvious incentives to consider their
political and fiscal implications. Affected parties do not vote in the local
elections, and the fiscal losses resulting from decreased property tax or sales
tax revenues fall on other municipalities.283 Notwithstanding the general
model of long-term relationships among neighboring local governments, the
problem of apathy to cross-border externalities is a documented phenomenon
and is often exacerbated by an open contest for tax-yielding businesses.284
In the latter case, apathy may turn into an intention to shift market activity
across borders.285
To illustrate this problem, consider a 2004 amendment to the California
Government Code, which forbids local governments to provide “any form of
financial assistance to a vehicle dealer or big box retailer . . . that is
relocating from the territorial jurisdiction of one local agency to the
territorial jurisdiction of another local agency but within the same market
area.”286 This legislation, while controversial,287 clearly intends to limit
intergovernmental market externalities by prohibiting neighboring agencies
from luring developments.
This phenomenon is not limited to retail land uses: cities in California’s
Bay Area compete for big office complexes and use zoning to turn
underutilized land uses into corporate offices.288 Apple’s new headquarters
in Cupertino is a prominent example.289 Recent empirical evidence shows
that local governments are well aware of the nature and scope of market
externalities and may consequently design their land uses to maximize
positive externalities within their jurisdiction and to shift bad ones

282. See, e.g., Helen F. Ladd, Land Use Regulation as a Fiscal Tool, in LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES: UNDERSTANDING THE
LINKS 55 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1998).
283. Lehavi, supra note 9, at 941-45.
284. Id. at 940-56.
285. Lehavi, supra note 9, at 940-56.
286. Cal. Gov. Code. § 53084 (West 2006).
287. See MAX NEIMAN ET AL., LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA’S SUBURBS: 1990-1997 (2000) (offering a criticism of this statutory intervention
and an argument that inter-local competition did not have an independent effect on local
development policies prior to this legislation).
288. Interview with Joshua Abrams, supra note 230.
289. See Apple Campus 2 Construction Update, CITY OF CUPERTINO,
http://www.cupertino.org/index.aspx?page=1223 [https://perma.cc/67HX-JEQ6].
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elsewhere.290 For example, as Shoag and Veuger show, the precise physical
shape of municipal borders matters for capturing the positive market
externalities of big-box stores.291 “Compact” cities, such as a city shaped
like a perfect circle, can capture nearly all the benefits of a big-box store
placed in the middle. In contrast, non-compact cities, such as an “L” shapedone, do not enjoy the same result, with much of the positive effects instead
crossing their borders.292 Accordingly, compact cities focus more on retail
development, including through subsidies, than non-compact ones.293 Cities
consciously respond, therefore, to the inter-local dimensions of market
externalities.
Should local governments ever be liable to adjacent municipalities for
adverse market externalities? If so, what could be the basis for legal recourse
against local governments for market externalities that can be attributed to
zoning or other regulatory decisions? As shown above,294 private law is not
the appropriate means for addressing intra-local market externalities, and is
similarly poorly suited to address inter-local market externalities. A
developer’s decision to set up a new business and, correspondingly, a city’s
decision to approve the required zoning cannot be viewed as constituting a
legal wrong because the increased competition will inflict losses on current
businesses.295 An existing business should not be viewed as having an
enforceable right or a principled normative claim for preserving the
economic status-quo under such circumstances.296 Awarding such a private
entitlement could inadvertently lead to private litigation between two
competitors, who will miss out on the broader view of the multi-party
market-equilibrium effects.297 The justification for controlling against
potential market externalities lies in the local government’s ability to shape
a broad-based policy regarding the various aspects of market effects, and it
should be held responsible for properly administering this policy.298
The appropriate entities to contest zoning measures that generate extralocal market externalities are adjacent local governments rather than private
individuals or businesses located within them.299 A neighboring local

290. Lehavi, supra note 9, at 948-52.
291. Shoag & Veuger, supra note 145, at 16-23.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
295. Cf. the discussion about why businesses do not generally have legal obligations
toward competitors for any pecuniary externalities inflicted by their market activity supra
notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
299. Lehavi, supra note 9, at 962-77.
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government is the body that can attest to, or at least claim to identify, the
overall market externalities (positive and negative) within its boundaries.300
Adjacent municipalities are better situated to assess the overall change in
market-equilibrium and to act upon it.
One possibility is to introduce an “intergovernmental liability rule”
regime301 through which local governments could be held liable to adjacent
municipalities for fiscal losses that the latter incurred in decreased property
taxes and other revenues because of a land use decision with adverse
extraterritorial effects. Focusing on these public entities and public revenues
as the basis for compensation would keep intact the normative separation
between private law entitlements and the collective implications of
government regulation, with such payments serving as a proxy for societal
welfare.302
Another suggestion, in the context of inter-local market externalities, is a
more modest one. Judicial review of zoning decisions should hold the local
government accountable for the potential threat of “regulatory
opportunism,”303 by which a certain municipality seeks to shoulder a specific
negative market externality onto the residents of adjacent localities.304
The criteria for holding a municipality responsible for inter-local market
externalities, generated by its zoning decision, should be based primarily on
the consistency of such effects with the policy adopted by the municipality
to regulate its intra-local externalities. For example, if City A explicitly
adopts a policy that considers the effects of big-box retailers on the economic
viability of small retailers in the CBD and, accordingly, allows big-box
developments only beyond a certain radius—e.g., two miles from its own
CBD—it should be scrutinized for rezoning a tract located only one mile
from the CBD of City B. Even if no such explicit statement by City A exists
on the record, City B should be able to otherwise demonstrate the existence
of such a policy. City B can do so by pointing to previous zoning decisions
or to the differential effects of the current one, passing the onus to City A to
show that it would have made the same zoning decision had the entire array
of market externalities remained within its boundaries. City A would thus
have to show that its broad-based policy, under which it exercises its power
to regulate market externalities, is furthered by the challenged decision and
that the decision bears a reasonable relation to the broader policy.

300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Cf. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Mayo, Regulatory Opportunism and Investment
Behavior: Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry, 36 RAND J. ECON. 628 (2005).
304. Lehavi, supra note 9, at 962-77.
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This standard of review also sheds light on the potential legal implications
of positive intergovernmental market externalities. A local government is
not legally required to confer positive market externalities on adjacent
municipalities.305 As long as the current political system of local
governments (rather than regional ones) remains intact,306 with the power of
zoning vested in them under the SZEA or other state law, a city is not
required to share the benefits of positive market externalities with other cities
if its neighbors cannot prove the existence of cross-border negative
effects.307
Accordingly, the conferral of positive market externalities should be
primarily the result of pre-zoning negotiations between the respective local
governments, with adjacent localities potentially offering incentives or other
goods to the municipality in which the project is located, so that the project
would be designed to provide cross-border benefits. These could be similar
to the incentives a local government offers developers to maximize intralocal positive externalities.308
CONCLUSION
The centennial of the 1916 New York City Ordinance and creation of
zoning in the United States provides an exceptional opportunity to reconsider
the regulatory and legal basis upon which this key governmental power is
founded. The motive to control the various market externalities embedded
in land use regulation, from effects on commercial activity, to housing prices
and job-related housing needs, has practically guided local governments
from the very first days of zoning. Yet, at the same time, such considerations
of market externalities remain in the shadows of explicit zoning law and
policy, as the discussion is re-routed to the allegedly more stable foundations
of zoning, such as control of technological or environmental, fiscal, or social
externalities. This reality must change.
305. Id. at 984-87.
306. The debate over the appropriate form of sub-state governance remains, of course,
outside the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the localism/regionalism debate, see
Lehavi, supra note 9, at 949-52.
307. See id.
308. See supra Section III.A. A much more careful approach should be taken with respect
to a potential claim in restitution made by a municipality that actually confers positive market
externalities on adjacent local governments. Consider a scenario in which a zoning decision
approving the construction of a high-end subdivision positively effects the real estate market
for nearby properties across the municipal borders, resulting, in turn, in higher property tax
receipts for the neighboring municipality. Creating an accounting mechanism could make
sense only as part of a broader intergovernmental liability rule regime that is primarily
targeted at disciplining adverse cross-border fiscal externalities. If done purely on the
intergovernmental level, rather than through private law mechanisms, a normative case could
be made for a mirror-imaged accounting system for positive and negative market externalities.
I will leave the discussion of such a potential mechanism to a different time.
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Beyond identifying the regulatory and legal principles for the use of the
zoning power to control against market externalities, the analysis in this
Article sheds new light on the interplay between legislative or broad-based
policy and ad hoc or adjudicative decision making in land use regulation.
Market externalities exemplify how legislative or broad-based decision
making is essential to both identify externalities and devise regulatory
solutions to them. From an economic perspective, a market externality is a
process in which a certain market-equilibrium undergoes a change through
the price system, implicating numerous parties on both the supply and
demand sides. There is no economic justification to narrowly identifying a
market externality, or in designing a response, without a broader picture of
the changing economic landscape of the city.
From a legal perspective, out of all the types of land use related
externalities, the generation of market externalities tends to be reciprocal and
blameless in nature. This means that the legal validation of measures to
control such externalities must be based on a credible, broad policy that does
not solely rely on ad hoc normative judgment. When a market externality is
concerned, a substantial relation or reasonable relationship may prove the
only feasible way for courts to address the legal validity of broad-based,
legislative zoning mechanisms intended to address the spectrum of market
externalities.
The innovative framework developed in this Article provides a way to
close the long-existing gap between economics and law in the study of
zoning and externalities. These normative principles offer a promising start
for the upcoming century of land use regulation, as American society deals
with the increasing challenges of its cities.

